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 Implementing the Lessons from Wrongful 
Convictions: An Empirical Analysis of 
Eyewitness Identification Reform Strategies 
Keith A. Findley* 
ABSTRACT 
Learning about the flaws in the criminal justice system that have pro-
duced wrongful convictions has progressed at a dramatic pace since the first 
innocent individuals were exonerated by postconviction DNA testing in 1989.  
Application of that knowledge to improving the criminal justice system, how-
ever, has lagged far behind the growth in knowledge.  Likewise, while con-
siderable scholarship has been devoted to identifying the factors that produce 
wrongful convictions, very little scholarly attention has been devoted to the 
processes through which knowledge about causes is translated into reform. 
Using eyewitness misidentification – one of the leading contributors to 
wrongful convictions and the most thoroughly and scientifically studied of 
those contributors – as the focus, this Article begins to fill that void by empir-
ically analyzing a variety of approaches to eyewitness identification reform 
that have been attempted.  This Article establishes a taxonomy of reform ef-
forts that includes top-down, command-and-control legislation; entirely bot-
tom-up, essentially laissez-faire approaches to identification practices; and a 
hybrid that builds on emerging notions of democratic experimentalism – a 
form of “new governance” – to foster bottom-up experimentation by impos-
ing obligations on police while giving them the freedom to develop their own 
locally tailored responses to the problem of eyewitness error. 
The bulk of the empirical analysis assesses the effects of the hybrid, ex-
perimentalist approaches to reform, as a contrast to command-and-control 
approaches.  The analysis draws on previously collected national survey data 
as well as data from a few individual states, most prominently new data de-
veloped for this Article on the attempt to foster bottom-up eyewitness identifi-
cation reform in Wisconsin.  While more research is required before one can 
draw conclusions about which approach works best, the data suggest that the 
democratic experimentalist model shows promise for considerable, albeit 
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imperfect, implementation of social-science-based eyewitness identification 
reforms 
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INTRODUCTION 
DNA proved that Cody Davis was innocent of the West Palm Beach, 
Florida, robbery that landed him in prison.1  What was remarkable about his 
case was not so much that DNA evidence proved his innocence – more than 
300 individuals have been exonerated by DNA in recent years.2  Nor was it 
that that he served many years in prison before exoneration – he did not; un-
like most wrongly convicted individuals who spend years or decades in pris-
on, the DNA exonerated Davis after just five months in prison.  Nor was it 
unusual that the primary evidence used to convict him had been eyewitness 
identification testimony – eyewitness testimony is the most common eviden-
tiary feature of wrongful convictions among those later exonerated by DNA.3  
Rather, what was perhaps most noteworthy – aside from the fact that the 
DNA in his case was not tested before conviction – was that the eyewitness 
evidence was obtained in 2006 using traditional photo lineup methods, years 
after considerable social science research had shown that the procedures po-
lice used in his case were likely to create significant risks of misidentifica-
tion.  Despite abundant scientific research on better ways to conduct identifi-
cation procedures and extensive research demonstrating the prevalence of 
eyewitness error in wrongful conviction cases, police were still using old, 
unreliable identification procedures. 
Unfortunately, Davis’s case is hardly alone; it is, to the contrary, repre-
sentative of an alarming disconnect that has emerged between a growing 
body of knowledge about wrongful convictions and the steps that can be tak-
en to reduce them, on the one hand, and efforts in the criminal justice system 
to implement those measures, on the other. 
This Article marks a new turn in wrongful conviction scholarship by 
undertaking an analysis of the processes for translating learning into action to 
prevent wrongful convictions, particularly those based on eyewitness error.  It 
is a first-of-its-kind empirical analysis of the efficacy of reform efforts that lie 
on a spectrum from top-down legislative directives to bottom-up approaches 
that rely, to various degrees, on local experimentation to reform police eye-
witness identification practices. 
Learning about the flaws in the criminal justice system that have pro-
duced wrongful convictions has progressed at a dramatic pace since 1989, 
when postconviction DNA testing exonerated the first innocent individuals.4  
 
 1. Cody Davis, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-
false-imprisonment/cody-davis (last visited Feb. 21, 2016). 
 2. Exonerating the Innocent, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/free-innocent/exonerating-the-innocent (last visited Feb. 21, 2016). 
 3. Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/eyewitness-misidentification (last visited Feb. 
21, 2016). 
 4. In 1989, Gary Dotson in Illinois and David Vasquez in Virginia became the 
first convicted individuals “to be exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing.”  Keith 
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Research has focused primarily on specific recurring causes of wrongful con-
victions, including eyewitness identification errors,5 false confessions,6 
flawed forensic sciences,7 false jailhouse informant testimony,8 prosecutorial 
and police misconduct,9 and a host of cognitive biases that can combine with 
these factors to lead the system to focus on the wrong person (i.e., tunnel 
vision).10  While the research has largely addressed these specific error 
points, it has also approached the problem from a systems perspective, view-
ing error not just as, or even primarily, the result of individual and isolated 
human errors, but as the product of systemic and institutional arrangements 
that permit or create conditions for error.11  And while much remains to be 
learned even on these heavily studied matters, in many of these areas, the 
expansion of our knowledge has been nothing short of remarkable. 
Application of that knowledge to improving the criminal justice system, 
however, has lagged far behind the growth in knowledge.  For example, de-
spite considerable research about the interrogation techniques that can induce 
 
A. Findley, Innocence Found: The New Revolution in American Criminal Justice, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 3, 4 (Lucy Cooper ed., 2014). 
 5. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 
WIS. L. REV. 615, 615–16 (2006) [hereinafter Wells, Systemic Reforms]. 
 6. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confes-
sions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 901–07 (2003). 
 7. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter A PATH FORWARD], 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf. 
 8. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND 
THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2011). 
 9. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE 
ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009 
(2010), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/ncippubs/2. 
 10. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel 
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291 (2006). 
 11. James M. Doyle, NIJ’s Sentinel Events Initiative: Looking Back to Look 
Forward, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Nov. 2013), http://nij.gov/journals/273/Pages/sentinel-
events.aspx; James M. Doyle, The Paradigm Shift in Criminal Justice, CRIME REP. 
(Mar. 4, 2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/viewpoints/2014-03-the-
paradigm-shift-in-criminal-justice.  See James M. Doyle, How the ‘New Normal’ 
Convicts the Innocent, CRIME REP. (Feb. 4, 2015, 7:53 AM), http://www.thecrime
report.org/news/articles/2015-02-how-the-new-normal-convicts-the-innocent; Antho-
ny W. Batts et al., Perspectives in Policing: Policing and Wrongful Convictions, 
NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV. 15 (Aug. 2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/246328.pdf (“Implementing an organizational accident model allows 
police departments to review errors as systemwide weaknesses instead of single-cause 
mistakes.”); Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano, Sustainability of Innocence Reform, 77 
ALB. L. REV. 955, 955–56 (2014) (innocence “scholarship shows that errors of justice 
are not inevitable results of human fallibility but are produced by systems that are 
correctible”).  For an example of a systems approach to studying police error in one 
case, see JOHN SHANE, LEARNING FROM ERROR IN POLICING: A CASE STUDY IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENT THEORY (2013). 
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false confessions, little has been done in the United States12 to change the 
way police interrogate suspects, or the way courts approach admissibility of 
confession evidence.13  Moreover, although it is widely recognized that elec-
tronic recording of custodial interrogations is the single most important safe-
guard against false confessions, and that electronic recording is the future, 
most jurisdictions still do not require recording.14  Similarly, none of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences’s (“NAS”) recommendations from its ground-
breaking 2009 report on forensic sciences have been adopted, although the 
recommendations are finally, slowly, beginning to receive serious considera-
tion.15  Likewise, virtually nothing has been done in most jurisdictions to 
guard against false jailhouse informant testimony.16  And, in what is probably 
 
 12. Somewhat more has been done to reform police interrogation tactics in other 
places, notably the United Kingdom, where police use what they call the “investiga-
tive interview,” rather than the accusatory interrogation that is typical in the United 
States.  See, e.g., Brian L. Cutler et al., Interrogations and False Confessions: A Psy-
chological Perspective, 18 CANADIAN CRIM. L. REV. 153, 167 (2014); Barry C. Feld, 
Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops Question Kids, 23 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 415 (2013). 
 13. Sara C. Appleby et al., Police-Induced Confessions: An Empirical Analysis 
of Their Content and Impact, 19 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 111, 113 (2013); Brian L. 
Cutler, Keith A. Findley & Danielle Loney, Expert Testimony on Interrogation and 
False Confession, 82 UMKC L. REV. 589, 597 (2014); Deborah Davis & Richard A. 
Leo, To Walk in Their Shoes: The Problem of Missing, Misunderstood, and Misrepre-
sented Context in Judging Criminal Confessions, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 737, 751 
(2012); Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recom-
mendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010); Richard A. Leo & Kimberly D. 
Richman, Mandate the Electronic Recording of Police Interrogations, 6 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 791, 791 (2007); Jennifer T. Perillo & Saul M. Kassin, 
Inside Interrogation: The Lie, the Bluff, and False Confessions, 35 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 327 (2011). 
 14. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: 
Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1136 (2005). 
 15. A central recommendation of the NAS was that the federal government 
should create a National Institute for Forensic Sciences (“NIFS”).  A PATH FORWARD, 
supra note 7.  While Congress has balked at creating a new, independent federal 
agency, the Department of Justice and the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology have collaborated to create a National Commission on Forensic Sciences.  See 
Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Scis., General Information, National Commission on 
Forensic Science, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/ncfs (last visited Feb. 22, 
2016).  That Commission is beginning to address many of the recommendations in the 
NAS Report.  See Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Scis., Work Products, DEP’T JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/ncfs/work-products (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
 16. The exceptions are few and limited.  Most notable is Los Angeles, which was 
rocked in 1989 after notorious jailhouse snitch Leslie Vernon White demonstrated on 
national television how easy it was for snitches to obtain and present convincing false 
evidence in return for leniency in their own cases.  See, e.g., CAL. COMMISSION ON 
FAIR ADMIN. JUST., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING INFORMANT 
TESTIMONY 2 (Sept. 29, 2006), http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/jailhouse/
5
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the most rigorously and scientifically studied of all of these areas – eyewit-
ness identifications – reform has been spotty at best, despite abundant and 
solid scientific research that has largely settled on a host of “best practices” 
that can minimize the risk of eyewitness error.17 
This Article examines the problems with translating learning into re-
form, and thereby embarks on a new line of inquiry in wrongful convictions 
scholarship.  The Article examines efforts at implementing the lessons from 
the wrongful convictions, focusing in particular on the example of eyewitness 
identification reforms.  The Article focuses on eyewitness misidentification, 
both because misidentification is such a common feature of wrongful convic-
tions, and because, as we shall see, the scientifically based “best practices” 
for minimizing eyewitness error are so widely recognized.  Eyewitness identi-
fication, therefore, can be seen as a best-case scenario for reform.  By under-
taking this inquiry into eyewitness identification reform efforts, this Article 
joins a new wave of scholarship that moves beyond a focus “on the substan-
tive content of policies (e.g., the ‘causes and cures’ paradigm) . . . [to] the 
process by which public policy actually advances.”18 
In some respects, the slow pace of reform ought not be surprising.  The 
legal system is notoriously resistant to change, even when the premises upon 
which it rests shift.19  Slow, uneven reform is also to be expected given that 
 
official/official%20report.pdf.  Following a Grand Jury inquiry, the District Attor-
ney’s Office adopted policy guidelines strictly controlling the use of jailhouse in-
formants.  See id. at 3 (citing REPORT OF THE 1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND 
JURY: INVESTIGATION OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY (1990)).  Thereafter, in 2006, 
the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice issued a report rec-
ommending that all prosecutors in the state adopt similar policies and that the legisla-
ture enact a statutory requirement of corroboration of in-custody informant testimony.  
Id. at 4–9.  The legislature adopted a corroboration requirement in 2011.  CAL. PEN. 
CODE § 1111.5 (West 2016). 
 17. See Rebecca Brown & Stephen Saloom, The Imperative of Eyewitness Identi-
fication Reform and the Role of Police Leadership, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 535, 537, 539 
(2013).  Some questions about the accuracy of various eyewitness identification prac-
tices remain, however, and at least one scholar has argued that slow reform in this 
arena has helped to avoid requiring practices that may not be the most accurate.  See 
Steven E. Clark, Eyewitness Identification: California Reform Redux, 7 POL’Y 
MATTERS 5 (2015), http://policymatters.ucr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/pm-
vol7-1-eyewitness-reform.pdf. 
 18. Zalman & Carrano, supra note 11, at 965 (emphasis added).  See Marvin 
Zalman & Nancy E. Marion, The Public Policy Process and Innocence Reform, in 
WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 24 
(Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 2014). 
 19. See DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER, FLAWED CONVICTIONS: “SHAKEN BABY 
SYNDROME” AND THE INERTIA OF INJUSTICE (2014).  Focusing on so-called “Shaken 
Baby Syndrome” prosecutions, for example, Deborah Tuerkheimer has recently writ-
ten extensively about the slow and uneven way that science-dependent prosecutions 
have adapted to new understandings about the science they rely upon, leading to peri-
ods of entropy and an irrational distribution of justice.  Id.; Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
6
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the criminal justice system is notably diffuse and fragmented and, hence, 
difficult to move as an entity.  Others have long noted that to speak of a crim-
inal justice “system” is itself misleading, given that the “system” is made up 
of countless, largely independent, institutions and actors – including police,20 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation and parole officers, courts, and leg-
islatures.  Moreover, the criminal justice “system” is marked by geographical 
and jurisdictional dispersion; it is composed of both federal and separate state 
institutional structures, along with innumerable federal, state, and local courts 
and thousands of local, largely independent, police agencies.  Among other 
things, this diffusion means that adaptation to new knowledge can be slow 
and erratic. 
To be sure, progress on reform has been made – even dramatic progress 
for a system not known for its agility in reshaping itself.  Indeed, innocence-
based understandings and policy initiatives have advanced at a significant 
enough pace that they have become part of what some have labeled the “in-
nocence revolution.”21  But, as key observers of the innocence movement 
have acknowledged, the momentousness of these developments “should be 
balanced by evidence that reform is limited, partial, and spotty.”22 
While perhaps not surprising, the general unresponsiveness (or at least 
slowness) of the criminal justice system to lessons learned from the study of 
system error is nonetheless troubling.  For a system that prides itself on its 
commitment to truth and fairness, failure to incorporate new knowledge that 
can both minimize the risks of convicting the innocent and enhance the abil-
ity to convict the guilty is deeply problematic.23  The current sluggishness 
 
Science-Dependent Prosecution and the Problem of Epistemic Contingency: A Study 
of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 62 ALA. L. REV. 513 (2011); Deborah Tuerkheimer, The 
Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2009). 
 20. In almost every American jurisdiction, police are independent of any 
statewide or national governing structure.  Accordingly, in the United States today 
there are more than 18,000 autonomous law enforcement agencies, each enjoying the 
prerogative to establish its own practices and procedures.  See POLICE EXEC. 
RESEARCH FORUM, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 




 21. Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 573 (2004); Findley, supra note 4, at 3. 
 22. Zalman & Carrano, supra note 11, at 963. 
 23. Along with others, I have previously argued that many of the innocence-
based reforms come at no or little concomitant loss of conviction of the guilty, but 
rather, by enhancing the reliability of the system’s truth-seeking functions, can simul-
taneously protect the innocent and help convict the guilty.  See Keith A. Findley, 
Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges 
Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 133, 167 (2008).  That view 
is not free of all controversy, however.  See Steven E. Clark, Costs and Benefits of 
7
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demands inquiry into what approaches (if any) can be and have been effective 
at translating the growing body of knowledge about wrongful convictions 
into criminal justice system reforms. 
This Article examines these questions in several dimensions.  First, in 
Part I, the Article provides a brief overview of the lessons learned about eye-
witness error and its role in producing miscarriages of justice – both the con-
viction of the innocent and its mirror, the failure to convict the guilty.  Most 
importantly, this Part identifies the various “best practices” for conducting 
identification procedures that have been recognized by the social psychologi-
cal research and almost universally accepted by scholars and leading law 
enforcement organizations that have studied the research. 
In Part II, the Article then briefly canvasses the current state of practice 
around the country.  It identifies those jurisdictions where progress has been 
made implementing these “best practices” and those where reform has been 
slower, or virtually non-existent. 
Part III continues the survey of the current landscape by assessing judi-
cial doctrine and the role it plays in guiding eyewitness identification prac-
tice. 
In Part IV, the Article considers the various approaches to reform that 
have been attempted in these assorted jurisdictions, and it compares the rela-
tive effectiveness of these approaches in these jurisdictions.  It identifies sev-
eral different approaches attempted variously by legislatures, courts, and law 
enforcement agencies themselves.  First, some states employ “command and 
control” or “top down” directives.  Top-down approaches typically involve 
legislation or judicial decisions demanding compliance with best practices 
and defining for police the content of those best practices.  Second, some 
states have eschewed such direct control of police practices and have instead 
sought incremental reform premised on police buy-in and initiative.  In these 
states, reform efforts have focused on training and persuasion, hoping to get 
individual law enforcement agencies to adopt the best practices by choice.  
Third, some states, to varying degrees, have attempted a middle path, which 
can be seen to some degree as modeling emerging theories of “new govern-
ance” and, in particular, “democratic experimentalism.”24  In these jurisdic-
tions, reform is not top down, but bottom up.  But it is also not entirely lais-
sez-faire, leaving police to reform or not at their unguided discretion.  In-
 
Eyewitness Identification Reform: Psychological Science and Public Policy, 7 PERSP. 
ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 238 (2012) [hereinafter Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness 
Identification Reform].  The Clarkian critique, in turn, is itself subject to criticism.  
See Eryn J. Newman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Clarkian Logic on Trial, 7 PERSP. ON 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 260 (2012); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Reforms: 
Are Suggestiveness-Induced Hits and Guesses True Hits?, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 
264 (2012). 
 24. See Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin’s New 
Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 648 (2006); see also Kami Chavis 
Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police Accountability: A 
Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 376 (2010). 
8
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stead, it imposes on police at the local level a responsibility to develop poli-
cies and procedures designed to minimize eyewitness error.  Under this mod-
el, in its ideal form, those efforts at provisional and localized problem solving 
are then embedded within larger frameworks designed to encourage learning, 
compliance, and improvement.25 
The thickest analysis in this Article, in Part V, examines the data on the 
reform efforts, particularly the democratic experimentalist approach.  It draws 
upon national data, existing data from a few specific states, and new empiri-
cal data I have collected to examine an attempt to foster bottom-up reform in 
Wisconsin, based in part on principles of democratic experimentalism.  Part 
V describes the Wisconsin reform effort and its fit with experimentalist theo-
ry and compares the Wisconsin data I have collected with similar existing 
data from a few other jurisdictions, most notably Virginia, that have attempt-
ed similar or alternative reform models.  The Article concludes that the dem-
ocratic experimentalist model has achieved significant but incomplete suc-
cess, and it highlights additional measures that need to be pursued to improve 
police responsiveness. 
At the outset, it is important to note that the analysis in this Article is 
limited in scope in several ways.  First, while it considers alternative ap-
proaches to effecting eyewitness identification reform, it analyzes the data in 
depth only with regard to one approach – the approach that loosely, but im-
perfectly, fits the democratic experimentalist paradigm – and in greatest depth 
in one jurisdiction – Wisconsin.  A fuller assessment of the effectiveness of 
alternative reform models depends on additional research that thoroughly 
analyzes alternative approaches undertaken in other jurisdictions and under 
different circumstances.  Second, this analysis examines only the response on 
paper to the demand for reform by examining the written policies and proce-
dures adopted by law enforcement agencies.  While current anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that officers in the field in Wisconsin are indeed changing the 
way they conduct identification procedures in line with their written policies, 
it is not safe to assume that because police have reformed their practices on 
paper – the law on the books – they have fully changed them in practice – the 
law on the streets.  Follow-up research is required, and planned, to assess the 
extent to which reform is permeating the rank-and-file work of investigators. 
Finally, at the risk of stating the obvious, it should be noted explicitly 
that this analysis addresses reform of only one segment of the criminal justice 
system – the police – and the manner in which they conduct eyewitness iden-
tification procedures in particular.  That narrow focus is not to suggest either 
that the lessons from wrongful convictions point only to the need for improv-
ing police practices, or that the model analyzed here might achieve similar 
levels of effectiveness or ineffectiveness with other types of problems or oth-
er segments of the system.  The lessons from wrongful convictions do not just 
teach about the need for better police practices, but indeed about the need for 
improved practices throughout the system.  Among other things, these other 
 
 25. Kruse, supra note 24, at 648. 
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lessons include the need for reform in the way the system produces and uses 
evidence beyond eyewitness testimony, including forensic science evidence, 
confessions, informant testimony – indeed, virtually all types of evidence.  
The lessons extend as well to the need for reform in the way that prosecutors 
and defense attorneys are funded and do their work, the rules that govern 
access to and admissibility of evidence and the proceedings at trial, and the 
procedures and standards for reviewing appeals and post-conviction claims of 
innocence. 
But because eyewitness error is such a prominent feature of known 
wrongful convictions, and because the “best practices” for reducing misiden-
tifications are, uniquely among the “causes” of wrongful convictions, thor-
oughly researched and in their general contours almost universally accepted, 
this problem is a good one with which to begin the discussion about how to 
move from learning about error to actually changing the system to minimize 
error. 
I.  THE SOCIAL-SCIENCE-BASED “BEST PRACTICES” FOR 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
For more than a century, psychologists have studied human perception 
and memory and the ways they affect reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tions.26  While that research lay fallow for decades,27 the study of eyewitness 
identifications escalated dramatically in the 1970s and has proceeded at a 
rapid pace ever since.28  While the legal system, for its part, has occasionally 
noted the data on the fallibility of eyewitness identification,29 until recently 
courts have largely ignored the lessons from the psychological research.30  
 
 26. See JAMES M. DOYLE, TRUE WITNESS: COPS, COURTS, SCIENCE, AND THE 
BATTLE AGAINST MISIDENTIFICATION xi (2005).  Professor Hugo Munsterberg, the 
German-born chair of Harvard’s psychology laboratory, conducted groundbreaking 
psychological research on eyewitness error in the early days of the twentieth century.  
Id. at 9. 
 27. For an engaging and informative telling of the largely unsuccessful efforts of 
Professor Munsterberg to get the legal academy to take note of the psychological 
science, see id. at 9–34. 
 28. Id. at 98. 
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 30. See Gary L. Wells et al., Why Do Motions to Suppress Suggestive Eyewitness 
Identifications Fail?, in CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT: LESSONS FROM 
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 168 (Brian L. Cutler, ed., 2012) [hereinafter Wells et al., 
Why Do Motions to Suppress Suggestive Eyewitness Identifications Fail?].  Indeed, as 
numerous scholars have now noted, the well-known due process test adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Manson v. Brathwaite and Neil v. Biggers directs courts to assess 
reliability of confession evidence based upon factors that the empirical research 
shows are not correlated with accuracy.  See id. at 167–84 (citing Manson v. 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)); Findley, su-
pra note 4. 
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With the introduction of DNA evidence and its ability to determine guilt and 
innocence with near certainty – and hence, to prove the inaccuracy of some 
eyewitness identifications – the scope and magnitude of the problem of eye-
witness error for the first time became unavoidably glaring.  Quickly, re-
searchers began to realize that eyewitness error was a leading contributor to 
the emerging phenomenon of wrongful convictions.  Study after study sug-
gested that, in upwards of seventy-five percent of the cases in which DNA 
had proved that a convicted individual was actually innocent, eyewitness 
error was a contributing factor in the wrongful conviction.31  Although reform 
remained slow, the legal system began to take notice. 
The aftermath of this extensive research has resulted in development of 
a set of practices almost universally agreed upon in its broad outline as a set 
of “best practices” for minimizing the risks of contaminating eyewitness 
identification evidence.  A “white paper” commissioned by the American 
Psychology and Law Society in 1998 was among the first official publica-
tions to note the growing consensus among researchers about a set of best 
practices.32  A year later, in 1999, the National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”) of 
the U.S. Department of Justice compiled the most up-to-date research and 
published a similar set of findings and recommendations in an official guide 
for law enforcement (the “NIJ guidelines”).33  The American Bar Association 
followed a few years later with a published statement of best practices that 
incorporated similar findings and recommendations.34  In the states, commis-
sion after commission created to examine the problem of eyewitness error in 
 
 31. See Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 3; BRANDON L. GARRETT, 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 48 (2011); 
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 122–25 (2008) 
[hereinafter Garrett, Judging Innocence]; BUREAU OF TRAINING & STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, WIS. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2005) [hereinafter WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY], 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/2009-news/eyewitness-public-
20091105.pdf.  Subsequent data collected by Sam Gross and his colleagues, which 
they maintain through the National Registry of Exonerations, suggests that, when one 
moves beyond the DNA exonerations to look at all exonerations, regardless of the 
nature of the evidence used to exonerate, eyewitness error remains a significant, but 
not quite so prevalent, contributor to the problem.  Alexandra E. Gross, Witness Re-
cantation Study: Preliminary Findings, U. MICH. L. SCH. (Samuel R. Gross ed., May 
2013), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/RecantationUpdate
_5_2013.pdf. 
 32. See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommen-
dations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603 (1998). 
 33. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A 
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999) [hereinafter EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE], 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf. 
 34. American Bar Association Statement of Best Practices for Promoting the 
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the aftermath of wrongful convictions recognized essentially the same list of 
reforms.35  Several state attorneys general issued guidelines incorporating the 
research-based recommendations.36  In 2010, the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police issued a model policy for eyewitness identifications embrac-
ing the reforms.37  And, most recently, the NAS issued a report whose pur-
pose was to settle the science of eyewitness identification, similarly agreeing 
upon many of these reforms.38  As the NAS concluded, “A range of best prac-
tices has been validated by scientific methods and research and represents a 
starting place for efforts to improve eyewitness identification procedures.”39 
While the reports and policies vary in their scope and specificity, the es-
sence of their recommendations is generally consistent.  My purpose in set-
ting forth the basic recommendations below is not to fully discuss or analyze 
all of the reforms, or to suggest that all have been equally embraced by each 
of the organizations or reports referenced above (indeed, a few of the reform 
recommendations have undergone some scientific revision or controversy in 
recent years, and my purpose here is not to assess their individual scientific 
strengths).  Rather, my objective is just to outline a set of recommended “best 
practices” – those that have typically been adopted by legislatures or govern-
mental policy-makers – in order to provide a baseline for assessing the effec-
tiveness of reform efforts at implementing those practices. 
A.  Only One Suspect Per Procedure 
First, the research suggests that, in every case, no matter how many sus-
pects there might be, each lineup procedure (whether live or photographic) 
should contain only one suspect.40  A lineup is a test of an eyewitness’s abil-
 
 35. See, e.g., N.C. ACTUAL INNOCENCE COMM’N, N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. 
SERVICES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, http://www.
ncids.org/New%20Legal%20Resources/Eyewitness%20ID.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 
2016); CAL. COMM’N ON FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
REGARDING EYE WITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (Apr. 13, 2006), 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/eyewitness/official/eyewitnessidrep.pdf. 
 36. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LIVE 
LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (Apr. 18, 2001) [hereinafter N.J. ATT’Y GEN. 
GUIDELINES], http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf; WIS. DOJ MODEL 
POLICY, supra note 31, at 7–12. 
 37. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION MODEL 
POLICY (2010), http://dpa.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/BE390C82-E7DD-4A1E-8A3A-
4702C5110CD1/0/InternationalAssocofChiefsofPolice.pdf. 
 38. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2014) [hereinafter IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT] 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/copy_of_Identifyingthe
CulpritAssessingEyewitnessIdentificationNAS10.02.2014.pdf. 
 39. Id. at 104. 
 40. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 623; Gary L. Wells & John W. 
Turtle, Eyewitness Identification: The Importance of Lineup Models, 99 PSYCHOL. 
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ity to accurately use recognition memory, not guesswork, to select a sus-
pect.41  A lineup with more than one suspect (or worse, a lineup consisting 
entirely of suspects, like the now infamous Duke lacrosse team photo lineup) 
means the witness is given a multiple-choice test with more than one right 
answer (or even no wrong answers, as in the Duke case).42  Such a test is 
obviously less probative (or barely probative at all) than a test with only one 
suspect.43  There is no real disagreement about this recommendation. 
B.  Proper Selection of “Fillers” 
Second, in any lineup, the suspect should not stand out.44  Generally, 
this means the perpetrator or his photograph should not exhibit any unique 
features that draw attention to him, and that both the innocent fillers and the 
suspect should generally fit the description of the perpetrator.45  Among re-
searchers and policy makers, there is again no disagreement about the need to 
avoid suggestiveness in filler selection,46 although some newly adopted poli-
 
BULL. 320, 320–21, 328 (1986) (explaining research demonstrating that having more 
than one suspect in a lineup dramatically increases the chances of a mistaken identifi-
cation). 
 41. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 618–19. 
 42. See STUART TAYLOR, JR. & K.C. JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: 
POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE 
RAPE CASE 38–39 (2007); Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 623.  In the 
Duke lacrosse case, the complainant alleged she had been raped by several members 
of the lacrosse team.  TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra.  Police presented the complainant 
with a photo of the entire lacrosse team and asked her to pick out the assailants.  Id. at 
38.  Because everyone in the photo was equally likely to be a suspect, there was no 
way to assess whether she was making an error by picking someone who could not 
have been one of the perpetrators. 
 43. See Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 623. 
 44. Id. at 624; see also Steven E. Clark, A Re-examination of the Effects of Bi-
ased Lineup Instructions in Eyewitness Identification, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 395, 
422 (2005) (noting that innocent suspect identification would be significantly reduced 
if the innocent suspect does not stand out); R.C.L. Lindsay & Gary L. Wells, What 
Price Justice? Exploring the Relationship of Lineup Fairness to Identification Accu-
racy, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 303, 313 (1980) (noting that courts can have more con-
fidence in identifications from high-similarity lineups). 
 45. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 624.  There are exceptions to this 
principle, however, when the suspect himself does not fit the description of the perpe-
trator; in that case, the fillers should all deviate from the description of the perpetrator 
in the same way as the suspect so that the suspect does not stand out.  Id. 
 46. One researcher has raised concerns about this recommendation, but even he 
does not disagree with the proposition that suggestiveness of this sort should general-
ly be avoided.  See Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform, 
supra note 23, at 243.  Steven Clark argues, instead, merely that the data suggests that 
avoiding suggestiveness in the composition of lineups and photo arrays may diminish 
the number of suspect “hits.”  Id.  Others have responded by noting that a reduction in 
the number of “hits” is to be expected – and desired – from a non-suggestive lineup or 
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cies continue to fail to embrace the “match-to-description” recommenda-
tion.47 
C.  Unbiased Witness Instructions 
Third, prior to showing the witness the lineup, the law enforcement of-
ficer should instruct the witness that the perpetrator may or may not be pre-
sent in the lineup, that the detective does not know who the suspect is, that it 
is as important to clear the innocent as identify the guilty, and that if the wit-
ness identifies no one the investigation will continue.48  Research shows that 
this instruction lowers rates of mistaken identifications in offender-absent 
lineups but has little effect on reducing identifications when the offender is 
present in the lineup.49  Without this instruction, witnesses naturally surmise 
that police have caught the perpetrator and their task is to pick him out.50  
They therefore work hard to pick someone in the lineup, even if the real per-
petrator is not present.51  This instruction is thus like a multiple choice test 
that includes a final option of “none of the above”; without that option, test-
takers feel compelled to pick one of the answers presented, but with the in-
struction they are given license to say nothing fits.52  Again, the consensus on 
this recommendation is clear.53 
 
array, because the very purpose of designing the procedure so the suspect does not 
stand out is to prevent police from signaling to the witness which individual or photo 
to select.  See Newman & Loftus, supra note 23, at 262; Wells et al., supra note 23, at 
267.  Clark, himself, does not necessarily disagree with that proposition, or is at most 
agnostic about it.  See Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform, 
supra note 23. 
 47. The recent policy issued by New York State’s Municipal Police Training 
Council, for example, which was developed by a “Best Practices Committee” in col-
laboration with the District Attorneys Association of New York, recommends a filler 
selection process whereby no one member stands out.  N.Y. STATE MUN. POLICE 
TRAINING COUNCIL, IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES: PHOTO ARRAYS AND LINE-UPS 
MODEL POLICY 2 (Mar. 2015), http://pceinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/
Eyewitness-Identification-Model-Photo-Array-and-Lineup-ID-Procedures.pdf. 
 48. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 625. 
 49. Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup 
Instructions and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 482, 486–87 
(1997). 
 50. See id. 
 51. Id. at 489. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Clark has cautioned that giving such “unbiased” witness instructions (his 
term) do, as one would expect, also have some small impact on reducing the number 
of correct identifications.  See Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification 
Reform, supra note 23, at 243.  The effect is expected because it should operate to 
reduce the rate at which witnesses will think they must pick someone or do not really 
have a memory of who it was and will by luck pick the perpetrator.  See id. at 250.  At 
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D.  Double-Blind Administration 
Fourth, one of the most important reforms, which a limited but growing 
number of jurisdictions are now employing, requires that identification pro-
cedures always use a double-blind testing protocol.54  Although the 1999 NIJ 
Guide took no position on it, researchers almost universally agree that dou-
ble-blind testing is the most fundamental of all of the reforms, and the recent 
report of NAS identified it as one of the core reforms that is scientifically 
valid and settled.55  Essential to any type of objective testing, double-blind 
testing (often referred to in the eyewitness context as simply “blind” proce-
dures) refers to the practice in which neither the subject of the test (here, the 
eyewitness) nor the test administrator (here, the police investigator) knows 
the “answer” (here, which person is the suspect).56  The purpose is to prevent 
the tester from unintentionally influencing either the outcome of the proce-
dure or the certainty of the eyewitness.57  This recommendation is not based 
upon any doubts about police integrity; rather, it is based on the well-
accepted understanding that people are influenced by their own beliefs, and 
that they can unknowingly leak information, which can influence the sub-
ject’s responses on the tests and the administrator’s interpretations of the re-
sults.58  It is the same principle that demands that any scientific laboratory 
testing – such as testing of a new medication – be double blind, so that nei-
ther the patient nor the person dispensing the drug and evaluating the patient 
knows whether the patient received the real drug or a placebo.59  While some 
 
the same time, Clark does not argue against adopting this recommendation, but simp-
ly argues that policy-makers should be aware of this effect.  See id. at 251. 
 54. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 629; Gary L. Wells et al., Recom-
mendations for Properly Conducted Lineup Identification Tasks, in ADULT 
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 223, 236 (David 
Frank Ross et al. eds., 1994). 
 55. See IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 38, at 106–07. 
 56. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 629. 
 57. Id. at 624, 630.  The risk of influence in eyewitness identification procedures 
is real.  See Ryann M. Haw & Ronald P. Fisher, Effects of Administrator-Witness 
Contact on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 89 J.  APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1106, 1106–
07 (2004); Mark R. Phillips et al., Double-Blind Photoarray Administration as a 
Safeguard Against Investigator Bias, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 940, 941 (1999); Melis-
sa B. Russano et al., “Why Don’t You Take Another Look at Number Three?”: Inves-
tigator Knowledge and Its Effects on Eyewitness Confidence and Identification Deci-
sions, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL. & ETHICS J. 355, 358–59 (2006); Gary L. Wells & 
Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses 
Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED SCI. 360, 360 
(1998). 
 58. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 629. 
 59. Id. 
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cost may result from requiring a “blind” administrator, those costs can be 
minimized or virtually eliminated.60 
Significantly, researchers note, the blind procedure does not cost any-
thing in terms of lost valid identifications of the guilty.61  Double-blind pro-
cedures lose no probative identification information at all; rather, they merely 
prevent lineup administrators from giving potentially suggestive cues that 
might lead eyewitnesses to pick out a suspect.62  Identifications in lineups that 
are not double blind may not be legitimate identification evidence63 in the 
same sense that no one would accept the results of a lineup in which the po-
lice overtly told the witness that the suspect is number four and she should 
therefore pick number four.64  Accordingly, this reform is almost universally 
viewed by researchers, including now the NAS, as among the most funda-
mental.65 
 
 60. Id. at 632.  Some smaller jurisdictions may find it difficult to find or assign 
an independent lineup administrator who knows nothing about the case.  See WIS. 
DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31, at 13.  But that problem can be resolved.  For 
example, when using photo arrays (which comprise the vast majority of identification 
procedures today), the administrator can be functionally blinded by having the wit-
ness look at the photos on a computer screen that is not visible to the administrator or 
by having the administrator put individual photographs in separate file folders that are 
shuffled before being presented to the witness so that the investigator does not know 
and cannot see which folder contains the suspect.  See id. at 13. 
 61. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 625. 
 62. Id. at 630; D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justi-
fied Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 797 n.73 
(2007). 
 63. See Risinger, supra note 62, at 798 n.74.  Risinger argues that a blind testing 
protocol for eyewitness identification procedures (as well as for the forensic sciences) 
is one of the best examples of “cost-free proposals” for reform.  Id. at 796–97. 
 64. See Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform, supra 
note 23, at 250 (“One can imagine a correct conviction based in part on an identifica-
tion procedure in which a police officer, convinced of the suspect’s guilt, simply tells 
the witness to circle and initial the suspect’s photograph in a photo lineup ‘or else.’”); 
Wells et al., supra note 23, at 265 (“If we say that all hits are legitimate, we would be 
asked to lament the lower hit rate that comes from not simply telling witnesses which 
lineup member they should pick.”). 
 65. Again, Clark cautions that, in laboratory studies, blind procedures cause 
some reduction in the rate at which witnesses make correct picks.  Clark, Costs and 
Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform, supra note 23, at 252.  But as noted 
below, well-constructed field studies have subsequently challenged that conclusion.  
See note 78, infra, and accompanying text.  And even Clark does not argue against 
double-blind procedures.  Indeed, while noting what he perceives to be a trade-off in 
terms of lost identifications, he has written: 
 
The principle behind blind lineup administration is intuitive, simple, and com-
pelling: If one is concerned that police might deliberately or inadvertently leak 
their expectations regarding the lineup, a reasonable solution is to prevent the 
police from having expectations, a solution that would be achieved through 
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss2/6
2016] IMPLEMENTING THE LESSONS  393 
E.  Prompt Recording of Confidence Statements 
Fifth, police should take and record a verbatim confidence statement 
from the witness immediately after any identification.66  Extensive research 
demonstrates that eyewitness confidence statements, at least those obtained at 
some interval after the identification itself, have little relation to accuracy, 
because eyewitness confidence is highly malleable and susceptible to taint 
from post-identification feedback.67  Even fairly minimal confirmatory feed-
back can significantly inflate a witness’s assessment of her own confidence.68  
To ensure that the eyewitness’s expression of confidence in an identification 
is based solely on the eyewitness’s independent recollection, not on any after-
acquired information or feedback, police should record the witness’s confi-
dence statement before she has an opportunity to receive any feedback.69  
Among researchers, no disagreement has been raised with this recommenda-
tion, although in the policy setting, police and prosecutors often push back 
against proposals to require prompt recording or confidence statements. 
F.  Only One Procedure Per Suspect 
Sixth, police should exhibit each suspect to any given witness only 
once.70  Currently, police frequently utilize multiple identification procedures 
with a single suspect to confirm an initial identification, to ensure that the 
witness made an accurate pick, or to bolster the persuasiveness of the identi-
 
blind lineup administration.  Simply put, one cannot leak what one does not 
know.  The principle is good.  Data would be better. 
 
Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform, supra note 23, at 282. 
 66. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 631. 
 67. See Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback 
on the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112, 117 (2002); Carolyn Semmler et al., Effects of Postidentifica-
tion Feedback on Eyewitness Identification and Nonidentification Confidence, 89 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 334, 342–43 (2004); Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al., Choosing, 
Confidence, and Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in 
Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 315, 324 (1995); Wells, Sys-
temic Reforms, supra note 5, at 620–21; Wells & Bradfield, supra note 57, at 372–73.  
More recently, some researchers have suggested that there is a significant correlation 
between confidence and accuracy, but only if the confidence statement is recorded 
promptly after the identification, before the witness has received confirming feed-
back.  See, e.g., John T. Wixted et al., Initial Eyewitness Confidence Reliably Predicts 
Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 70 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 515 (2015).  This latter 
research therefore continues to support the importance of this recommendation for 
prompt recording of confidence statements. 
 68. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 620–21. 
 69. See Bradfield et al., supra note 67, at 119. 
 70. State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 594 (Wis. 2005). 
17
Findley: Implementing the Lessons
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
394 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
fication.71  Police might, for example, first present the suspect to a witness in 
a showup (a one-on-one showup near the scene of the crime) and then follow 
that with a photo array, or they might initially display the suspect in a photo 
array and then follow up with a corporeal lineup.72  But research shows that 
multiple viewings of the same suspect are risky.73  Each viewing of a suspect 
alters the memory of the witness and makes subsequent identification of that 
suspect more likely, not because the witness accurately remembers the person 
from the crime, but rather from the prior identification procedure.74  Thus, 
police must understand that they should use the best, most reliable identifica-
tion procedures the first time because they will only have one opportunity to 
conduct a valid identification procedure with each suspect and witness.75 
G.  Sequential Presentation 
Seventh, and somewhat more controversially, many reformers recom-
mend presenting suspects and fillers to witnesses one at a time – sequentially 
– rather than simultaneously, as in the traditional photo array or corporeal 
lineup.76  The theory behind this recommendation, which is supported by 
extensive laboratory research77 and now also by field research,78 but is chal-
 
 71. See id. at 594–96. 
 72. See id. at 595–96. 
 73. See John C. Brigham & Donna L. Cairns, The Effect of Mugshot Inspections 
on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1394, 1394–95 
(1988); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Mugshot Exposure Effects: Retroactive Inter-
ference, Mugshot Commitment, Source Confusion, and Unconscious Transference, 30 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 287–88 (2006); Gabriel W. Gorenstein & Phoebe C. Ells-
worth, Effect of Choosing an Incorrect Photograph on a Later Identification by an 
Eyewitness, 65 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 616, 620–21 (1980); Tiffany Hinz & Kathy 
Pezdek, The Effect of Exposure to Multiple Lineups on Face Identification Accuracy, 
25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 195–97 (2001). 
 74. See Brigham & Cairns, supra note 73, at 1394; Deffenbacher et al., supra 
note 73, at 288; Gorenstein & Ellsworth, supra note 73, at 620–21; Hinz & Pezdek, 
supra note 73, at 195–97. 
 75. See WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31, at 6. 
 76. See R.C.L. Lindsay & Gary L. Wells, Improving Eyewitness Identifications 
from Lineups: Simultaneous Versus Sequential Lineup Presentation, 70 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 556, 559 (1985); Nancy M. Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in 
Sequential and Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459, 460 (2001); Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 
625–28. 
 77. See Lindsay & Wells, supra note 76, at 558; Steblay et al., supra note 76, at 
459–60. 
 78. Gary L. Wells et al., Double-Blind Photo-Lineups Using Actual Eyewitness-
es: An Experimental Test of a Sequential Versus Simultaneous Lineup Procedure, 39 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Wells et al., Double-Blind Photo-Lineups 
Using Actual Eyewitnesses]; Amy Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness Identifica-
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lenged by some recent research,79 is that eyewitnesses have a natural tenden-
cy to engage in what is known as the relative judgment process.  When mak-
ing selections, people naturally prefer to compare one item to the next, select-
ing the one that, when compared to the others, best fits their selection crite-
ria.80  In an eyewitness identification context, that selection method can be 
problematic if the true perpetrator is not included among the suspects and 
fillers in a lineup.81  The relative judgment process will lead the witness to 
compare all of the faces presented and pick the one that best matches her 
memory of the perpetrator.82  By definition, someone in every lineup will best 
match the perpetrator when compared to the others in the lineup.  Hence, 
according to this theory, the relative judgment process tends to induce people 
to pick out that best match, even if the true perpetrator is not present and the 
best match is an innocent person.83  Presenting images sequentially rather 
than simultaneously makes it more difficult for witnesses to engage in com-
parison shopping and pushes the witnesses instead to make absolute judg-
ments based upon memory.84 
 
tions: Hennepin County’s Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. 
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 381 (2006). 
 79. E.g., Karen L. Amendola & John T. Wixted, Comparing the Diagnostic 
Accuracy of Suspect Identifications Made by Actual Eyewitnesses From Simultaneous 
and Sequential Lineups in a Randomized Field Trial, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 263 (2015); SHERI H. MECKLENBURG, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-
BLIND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (2006), http://www.isp.state.il.us/docs/
ILPilotonEyewitnessID.pdf.  These studies, in turn, are themselves subject to criti-
cism and debate.  See, e.g., Gary L. Wells et al., The Flaw in Amendola and Wixted’s 
Conclusion on Simultaneous Versus Sequential Lineups, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 285 (2015) [hereinafter Wells et al., The Flaw in Amendola and 
Wixted’s Conclusion] (arguing that Amendola and Wixted’s conclusion was based on 
a sample of cases that was unrepresentative in a way that was heavily biased in favor 
of simultaneous lineups); Timothy P. O’Toole, What’s the Matter with Illinois? How 
an Opportunity Was Squandered To Conduct an Important Study on Eyewitness Iden-
tification Procedures, 30 CHAMPION 18, 19–21 (2006) (contending that the Mecklen-
burg Report was so methodologically flawed as to be meaningless); Daniel L. 
Schacter et al., Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness Investigations in the Field, 32 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 4 (2008) (same); Steblay et al., supra note 76 (same); Wells 
et al., Double-Blind Photo-Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses, supra note 78, at 12–
13 (same).  Some law enforcement agencies that adopted the double-blind sequential 
reform package also rejected the Mecklenburg Report as methodologically flawed.  
See BUREAU OF TRAINING & STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, WIS. DEP’T JUSTICE, 
RESPONSE TO CHICAGO REPORT ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (July 
21, 2006) [hereinafter RESPONSE TO CHICAGO REPORT], http://www.ripd.org/
Documents/APPENDIX/3/Wisconsin_2.pdf. 
 80. Steblay et al., supra note 76, at 460. 
 81. Lindsay & Wells, supra note 76, at 558. 
 82. Steblay et al., supra note 76, at 460. 
 83. See Lindsay & Wells, supra note 76, at 558. 
 84. Id. 
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Laboratory research confirms that the sequential method produces fewer 
mistaken identifications.85  Some evidence suggests, however, that the se-
quential method may also reduce the rate of accurate identifications.86  A 
meta-analysis of the research suggests that, in laboratory studies, accurate 
identifications might be reduced from about fifty percent to about thirty-five 
percent.87  But mistaken identifications of innocent suspects are reduced even 
more dramatically, from twenty-seven percent to nine percent.88  Thus, the 
ratio of accurate to mistaken identifications – the “diagnosticity ratio” – is 
superior in the sequential method compared to the simultaneous procedure.89  
Although sequential procedures produce fewer picks overall, they improve 
the odds that any picks will be accurate.90 
A recent, well-constructed field study of 494 identification procedures 
in actual cases in four police jurisdictions provides support for the superiority 
 
 85. See Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Improving the Reliability of Eye-
witness Identification: Lineup Construction and Presentation, 73 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 281, 288 (1988); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Biased Lineups: Sequential Presen-
tation Reduces the Problem, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 796, 800 (1991); Lindsay & 
Wells, supra note 76, at 562; R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Sequential Lineup Presentation: 
Technique Matters, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 741, 744 (1991); Wells, Systemic Re-
forms, supra note 5, at 626. 
 86. See Steblay et al., supra note 76, at 468.  Whether the laboratory studies 
accurately reflect what happens in the real world is debated.  See, e.g., O’Toole, supra 
note 79, at, 19–21; Schacter et al., supra note 79; Nancy Steblay, Observations on the 
Illinois Lineup Data, AUGSBURG C. (2006), http://web.augsburg.edu/~steblay/
observationsontheillinoisdata.pdf; Gary L. Wells, Comments on the Mecklenburg 
Report, IOWA ST. U. (2006), https://public.psych.iastate.edu/glwells/Illinois_Project
_Wells_comments.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).  Most of this debate arises from a 
report on a field study in three Illinois police jurisdictions conducted primarily under 
the direction of the Chicago Police Department pursuant to a statutory mandate to 
compare double-blind sequential and non-blind simultaneous procedures.  See 
MECKLENBURG, supra note 79, at 2–76.  That report purports to indicate that the non-
blind simultaneous procedure produced more suspect picks and fewer mistaken filler 
picks than the double-blind sequential procedure.  See id.  That study’s methodology 
was so flawed, however, and its results were so inconsistent, in some respects, with 
what is known from other laboratory and field studies, that most experts have con-
cluded that it is essentially meaningless.  See O’Toole, supra note 79, at 21; Schacter 
et al., supra note 79; Steblay et al., supra note 76, at 468; Wells et al., Double-Blind 
Photo-Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses, supra note 78, at 12–13.  Some law en-
forcement agencies that adopted the double-blind sequential reform package also 
rejected the Mecklenburg Report as methodologically flawed.  See RESPONSE TO 
CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 79. 
 87. Steblay et al., supra note 76, at 463.  Meta-analysis is a method of compiling 
and analyzing the data from multiple independent studies that purport to test the same 
phenomenon to obtain essentially aggregate data from those multiple studies.  Id. at 
460. 
 88. Id. at 463. 
 89. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 626–27. 
 90. Id. at 627. 
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of the sequential procedure.  That study found that, in real world settings as 
well as the laboratory, the sequential procedure improves the accuracy of 
witness picks.91  Importantly, the field study, unlike the laboratory studies, 
found no drop-off in suspect picks from using the sequential procedure.  
Thus, that field study suggests that the sequential procedure produces fewer 
errors, or known-innocent picks (eleven percent),92 than does the traditional 
simultaneous procedure (eighteen percent),93 while both produce suspect 
picks of approximately twenty-five percent.94  According to this analysis, 
therefore, the double-blind sequential procedure might indeed be a win-win 
proposition – producing fewer errors with no drop-off in suspect identifica-
tions. 
The matter is not free from dispute, however.  A reanalysis of a subset 
of the data from that field study by a separate team of researchers, utilizing a 
different analytical methodology, reached a contrary conclusion, suggesting 
superiority for the simultaneous procedure.95  That conclusion in turn has 
been criticized by the original researchers who collected the field data.96 
Because the laboratory studies suggest that the sequential method might 
produce some drop-off in accurate identifications, and because some re-
searchers now argue that the simultaneous procedure might be more accurate, 
the sequential procedure is not as universally recommended as the other re-
forms.  The NIJ and the NAS, for example, in their 1999 and 2014 reports 
(both published prior to the field study reported above), respectively, noted 
the research on sequential procedures, but reserved making any recommenda-
tion one way or the other on them.97  The 1999 NIJ guidelines observed that 
“scientific research indicates that identification procedures such as lineups 
and photo arrays produce more reliable evidence when the individual lineup 
members or photographs are shown to the witness sequentially—one at a 
time—rather than simultaneously.”98  Concluding, however, that there was no 
consensus about the sequential procedure, the NIJ made no recommendation 
 
 91. Wells et al., Double-Blind Photo-Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses, supra 
note 78.  The research was funded in part by support from the Laura and John Arnold 
Foundation, the Open Society Foundations, the JEHT Foundation, and the National 
Institute of Justice.  Id. at 1 n.1. 
 92. When considering only the witnesses who made an identification – that is, 
excluding those who did not pick anyone – the rate of selecting a filler was an alarm-
ing thirty-one percent.  Id. at 8. 
 93. Again, when considering only the witness who made an identification, the 
rate of selecting a filler was an even more alarming forty-one percent.  Id. 
 94. Id. at 1. 
 95. Amendola & Wixted, supra note 79. 
 96. See, e.g., Wells et al., The Flaw in Amendola and Wixted’s Conclusion, su-
pra note 79 (arguing that Amendola and Wixted’s conclusion was based on a subset 
of the data that was unrepresentative in a way that was heavily biased in favor of 
simultaneous lineups). 
 97. EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra note 33. 
 98. Id. at 9. 
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on the procedure.  The 2014 NAS Report, for its part, concluded that, “in 
certain cases, the state of scientific research on eyewitness identification is 
unsettled.  For example, the relative superiority of competing identification 
procedures (i.e., simultaneous versus sequential lineups) is unresolved.”99 
Despite this lack of unanimity on the sequential procedure, I include it 
in the analysis in this Article because it has received a great deal of attention, 
and, more importantly, most jurisdictions that have adopted written policies 
or reform legislation have included it.100  In particular, the Wisconsin Attor-
ney General’s Office, which created a model policy and procedure that local 
jurisdictions throughout the state were encouraged to adopt, and which I ana-
lyze in detail in this Article, incorporated the sequential procedure.101  It is, 
therefore, part of the package of reforms adopted in Wisconsin, which I as-
sess later in this Article. 
H.  Limit the Use of Showups 
Eighth, although many police policy statements do not address the topic 
(focusing instead on photo arrays and live lineups), researchers agree that 
showups present special problems of suggestiveness, and that, accordingly, 
police should limit their use to only those circumstances in which they have 
no alternative.102  A showup is a procedure in which a single suspect is pre-
sented for identification within a short time after and in close proximity to the 
scene of the crime.103  The rationale for using this inherently suggestive pro-
cedure is that police want to obtain an identification of the offender while the 
witness’s memory is fresh, or where, for logistical and legal reasons, they 
cannot construct a photo array or live lineup.104  “Research indicates, howev-
er, that showups produce higher rates of mistaken identification than do sim-
ultaneous lineups or sequential lineups, even when the witness is tested soon 
 
 99. IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 38, at 104. 
 100. Jurisdictions that require or recommend sequential procedures include New 
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin.  N.J. ATT’Y GEN. GUIDELINES, supra 
note 36; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52 (West 2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2933.83 (West 2016); WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31, at 1.  Numerous indi-
vidual law enforcement agencies have also independently adopted the procedure, 
including police departments in Tucson, Arizona; Santa Clara, California; Monterey, 
California; Denver, Colorado; Palm Beach County, Florida; Norwood, Massachusetts; 
Baltimore, Maryland; Hyattsville, Maryland; Hennepin County, Minnesota; Ramsey 
County, Minnesota; Colstrip, Montana; Charlotte-Mecklenberg, North Carolina; 
North Charleston, South Carolina; Austin, Texas; and Virginia Beach, Virginia.  Batts 
et al., supra note 11, at 9; POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 20, at 9. 
 101. WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31, at 1. 
 102. See Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 628. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. 
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after the witnessed event.”105  For this reason, most courts generally view 
showups with disfavor, although they nonetheless tend to permit them.106  
Police tend to like showups, both because they are easy to conduct quickly, 
and because they can use them even where they lack probable cause to detain 
the person while they conduct a photo array or live lineup.107  But the re-
search shows that they indeed simultaneously increase the rate of misidentifi-
cation and reduce the rate of accurate identification.108  They appear to be a 
lose-lose proposition, except in those limited circumstances when police can 
conduct the procedure almost immediately after the crime, before there has 
been significant memory loss, and where, for logistical or legal reasons, it is 
 
 105. Id.; see also Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform, 
supra note 23, at 244 (finding that, while other eyewitness identification reforms 
might cause some drop-off in correct identifications as well as a reduction in false 
identifications, lineups are superior to showups both in terms of reduced misidentifi-
cations and increased accurate identifications); Dawn J. Dekle et al., Children as 
Witnesses: A Comparison of Lineup Versus Showup Identification Methods, 10 
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1, 10 (1996) (discussing the risk of false positive iden-
tifications when showup procedures are used with children); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., 
Simultaneous Lineups, Sequential Lineups, and Showups: Eyewitness Identification 
Decisions of Adults and Children, 21 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 391, 402 (1997) (dis-
cussing the increased danger of false identifications with showups); A. Daniel 
Yarmey et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in Showups and Lineups, 20 
LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 459, 475 (1996) (discussing the inferiority of showup proce-
dures to successive lineups). 
 106. See, e.g., Ford v. State, 658 S.E.2d 428, 430 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (admitting 
showup identification despite acknowledging that “one-on-one showups have been 
sharply criticized” as being “inherently suggestive”); State v. Wilson, 827 A.2d 1143, 
1147–48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (acknowledging the suggestiveness of a 
showup, but concluding that it was nonetheless sufficiently reliable to be admissible); 
see also United States v. McGrath, 89 F. Supp. 2d 569, 571 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (conclud-
ing that identifications made during a showup were admissible); State v. Santos, 935 
A.2d 212, 225 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (same).  One state supreme court has held that 
under its state constitution, showups are so inherently suggestive, and hence unrelia-
ble, that showup identifications are not admissible unless police had no reasonable 
alternative.  See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005).  The court elaborated 
that a showup will not be necessary whenever police have the time and ability to 
construct a proper, non-suggestive live or photo lineup.  See id. at 595–96.  Thus, in 
most cases showups will be impermissible unless police lack probable cause to detain 
the suspect for a proper lineup procedure and are faced with a choice of conducting a 
showup or releasing the suspect without any identification procedure at all. 
 107. See Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform, supra 
note 23, at 244. 
 108. Clark suggests that policy preferences for lineups over showups are support-
ed by the research, because “lineups show lower false identification rates (.11) and 
slightly higher correct identification rates (.43) than showups (.18 and .41, respective-
ly).”  Id. 
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not possible to conduct a properly constructed photo array or lineup proce-
dure.109 
In sum, the eyewitness identification reforms present what appears to be 
the best case for systemic reform – solid scientific footing, near universal 
acceptance, and something for everyone – better evidence for prosecutors and 
police and reduced risks to innocent suspects.  Yet, as we shall see, reform 
has been neither swift nor even. 
II.  THE CURRENT STATE OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION POLICY 
REFORM 
Despite general acceptance of most of these eyewitness identification 
“best practices,” they have not been adopted uniformly.110  In 2013, the Po-
lice Executive Research Forum (“PERF”) conducted a nationwide survey 
with support from the NIJ to assess the state of eyewitness identification 
practice.  In summary, PERF found: 
The results of this survey show that law enforcement agencies for the 
most part have not implemented the full range of the 1999 NIJ guide-
lines.  Many agencies have adopted a few of the guidelines, but some 
guidelines have been adopted by less than half of the agencies.  Many 
agencies do not have written eyewitness identification policies, do not 
provide training to lineup administrators, and do not provide all rec-
ommended instructions to witnesses.111 
More specifically, PERF found that the vast majority of law enforce-
ment agencies have no written policies112 on showups (76.9%), photo arrays 
(64.3%), live lineups (84%), composites (90.6%), or mugshot searches 
(92.1%), although larger agencies of 500 or more sworn officers, which pre-
sumably do a large proportion of all identification procedures, tend to be 
more likely to have them. 113  Just over 40% of agencies reported using stand-
ardized written witness instructions for photo arrays, and 46% reported stand-
ardized written witness instructions for live lineups.114  Nearly 70% claimed 
they permit only one suspect per lineup.115  Significantly, however, most 
agencies do not require blind procedures – 69% percent permit non-blind 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 20, at 90. 
 111. Id. at xiv. 
 112. Scholars have long advocated the use of written policies to guide and im-
prove police performance on a variety of policing tasks.  See, e.g., Herman Goldstein, 
Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police Performance, 65 MICH. 
L. REV. 1123, 1126–27 (1967). 
 113. Id.  POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 20, at 79. 
 114. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 20, at ix. 
 115. Id. at x. 
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photo array procedures, and 92% permit non-blind live lineup procedures.116  
Likewise, most agencies continue to use simultaneous rather than sequential 
procedures – 68% for photo arrays and 65% for live lineups.117  Together, 
“the majority of agencies use non-blind simultaneous procedures, which are 
considered the traditional approach to administering lineups.”118 
As even these data suggest, however, this is not to say that no progress 
has been made.  Some jurisdictions have incorporated many or all of the best 
practices.119  And interestingly, most of these best practices have been adopt-
ed since 2010, suggesting that they have been made in response to recent 
research-based reform efforts.120  The point of this Article is to assess where 
the reforms have occurred and, more importantly, how they were achieved, in 
order to provide some insights about effective pathways for effecting change 
in police institutions to increase the reliability of the criminal justice system. 
In most states, including prominent jurisdictions such as California and 
New York, no statewide mandate has materialized to address or consider any 
or all of these recommendations.121  Rather, in those states, reform, if it has 
occurred, has been ad hoc and local, department by department.  Across the 
country there have been a few notable leaders in this respect, including police 
departments in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina;122 Austin, Texas;123 
Hennepin County, Minnesota;124 Ramsey County, Minnesota; Tucson, Arizo-
na;125 Suffolk County, Massachusetts,126 Madison, Wisconsin;127 Denver, 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at xi–ii. 
 120. Id. 
 121. In 2006, the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, 
which was created by California State Senate Resolution No. 44, recommended a set 
of best practices based on the social science research and urged the legislature to 
require the Attorney General of California to convene a task force “to develop Guide-
lines for policies, procedures and training with respect to the collection and handling 
of eyewitness evidence in criminal investigations by all law enforcement agencies 
operating in the State of California.”  CAL. COMM’N ON FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 35, at 5. 
 122. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 20, at 9. 
 123. Id. at 9, 94. 
 124. Id. at 9. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See SUFFOLK CTY. DIST. ATT’Y, MASS., THE REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, http://www.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/the-report-of-the-
task-force-on-eyewitness-evidence/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2016); Stanley Z. Fisher, 
Eyewitness Identification Reform in Massachusetts, 91 MASS. L. REV. 52, 58 (2008). 
 127. Winn S. Collins, Looks Can Be Deceiving: Safeguards for Eyewitness Identi-
fication, 77 WIS. LAW., no. 3 (Mar. 2004), http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/
wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?Volume=77&Issue=3&ArticleID=741. 
25
Findley: Implementing the Lessons
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
402 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Colorado;128 and Santa Clara County, California.129  But those departments 
are noteworthy because they have distinguished themselves, not because they 
represent the norm. 
Where reform has occurred on a broader basis, it has followed several 
distinct patterns, with varying degrees of success.  The first state to adopt the 
reforms in a wide-scale manner was New Jersey.130  That state, uniquely, has 
a vertically unified law enforcement system, in which the Attorney General 
has direct supervisory authority over all law enforcement agencies in the 
state.131  In 2001, then-Attorney General John Farmer directed all law en-
forcement agencies to adopt a package of “best practices” reforms, including 
double-blind sequential procedures “whenever practical” and “when possi-
ble.”132  No other state attorney general has similar authority to mandate these 
policies statewide. 
Other states followed to varying degrees in other ways.  As described in 
greater detail in the following section, several states, including Connecticut, 
Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, Vermont and, most recently, Colorado, 
Georgia, and Illinois, have mandated some or all of the best practices by stat-
utory directive.133  Others have encouraged law enforcement to study the 
matter and produce their own policies and procedures designed to improve 
reliability.  In states such as Nevada, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin, that has 
meant legislation requiring local law enforcement agencies to adopt policies 
and procedures of their own choosing to govern eyewitness identification 
procedures.134 
In other states, such as Rhode Island135 and West Virginia,136 legisla-
tures have appointed task forces to recommend eyewitness identification re-
 




 129. CAL. COMM’N ON FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 3. 
 130. N.J. ATT’Y GEN. GUIDELINES, supra note 36. 
 131. About the Division, ST. N.J., http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/aboutus.htm (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
 132. N.J. ATT’Y GEN. GUIDELINES, supra note 36.  In addition to mandating the 
new procedures, the New Jersey State Division of Criminal Justice worked with state 
and local agencies to train investigators.  A survey in 2003 found that law enforce-
ment agencies were largely, but imperfectly, complying: 84% estimated that they 
used sequential procedures “in every case,” and 62% reported that they used blind 
administrators “in every case.”  POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 20, at 
24. 
 133. See infra notes 191–20 and accompanying text. 
 134. See infra notes 265–77 and accompanying text. 
 135. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-1-16 (West 2016). 
 136. In 2007, West Virginia passed the Eyewitness Identification Act, which cre-
ated a task force to study and identify best practices for eyewitness identification.  W. 
VA. CODE  § 62-1E (West 2016).  Part of this Act requires law enforcement agencies 
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forms.  In Florida, a state Innocence Commission under the direction of the 
Florida Supreme Court issued standards recommending that each law en-
forcement agency file a written policy with the state that addresses the crea-
tion, composition, and use of lineups; the use of standardized witness instruc-
tions; steps to be taken to ensure that lineup administrators do not influence 
the witnesses (the standards stop short of requiring blind procedures); re-
quirements for documenting the procedure; methods of presenting the lineup; 
and police training.137  And in Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court in 
2011 convened a Study Group on Eyewitness Identification to “offer guid-
ance as to how our courts can most effectively deter unnecessarily suggestive 
identification procedures and minimize the risk of a wrongful conviction.”138  
As we shall see, these various approaches have produced varying degrees of 
success. 
III.  THE JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE 
The traditional response to problems with the reliability of evidence has 
been to look to the courts to regulate the flow of such evidence.  As an initial 
step in analyzing innocence-based reforms, it is important therefore to under-
stand the legal landscape and the extent to which judicial oversight holds a 
promise for reform.  Unfortunately, as with other types of innocence-based 
reform, judicial oversight of the production and use of eyewitness evidence 
has largely been a failure – with a few notable recent exceptions that might 
offer the promise of more effective judicial oversight. 
A.  Federal Constitutional Doctrine 
Historically, the only oversight of police eyewitness identification prac-
tices above the local police agency level was general judicial oversight under 
the Constitution.139  When the Supreme Court began to recognize the risks of 
eyewitness error in the 1960s, it first approached the problem in a classically 
 
to follow specific procedures when conducting eyewitness identifications.  Id. § 62-
1E-3. 
 137. FLA. DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, STANDARDS FOR FLORIDA STATE AND 
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN DEALING WITH PHOTOGRAPHIC OR LIVE 
LINEUPS IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (Mar. 1, 2011, rev. June 15, 2011), 
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/cms/Guidelines/Documents/Standards.aspx. 
 138. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STUDY GROUP ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE JUSTICES 1 (July 25, 2013), 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/eyewitness-evidence-report-2013.pdf (cit-
ing Letter from Roderick L. Ireland, Chief Justice, to Barbara J. Rouse, Superior 
Court Chief Justice (Oct. 17, 2011)). 
 139. The near-exclusive focus on judicial oversight under the Constitution reflects 
what Rachel Harmon calls the “conventional paradigm” of police supervision in the 
legal literature.  Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 
765 (2012). 
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lawyerly way, by recognizing, in United States v. Wade, a right to counsel at 
lineups under the Sixth Amendment.140  Because the Court subsequently held 
that the right to counsel in eyewitness identification procedures applies only 
post-indictment,141 and then only to live lineups and not photo arrays,142 that 
right became inconsequential in most eyewitness identification cases.  Most 
lineups are conducted before charging, and almost all use photos rather than 
live persons,143 circumstances in which the Wade right to counsel is inappli-
cable. 
Accordingly, to provide a more broadly applicable protection against 
mistaken identification, the Court also constructed a due process standard 
applicable to all types of identification procedures at all stages of the proceed-
ings.  In the 1970s, in Neil v. Biggers144 and Manson v. Brathwaite,145 the 
Court built off of its 1967 decision in Stovall v. Denno146 and held that the 
Due Process Clause requires courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, wheth-
er improper police conduct created a “substantial likelihood of misidentifica-
tion” and, thus, requires exclusion of eyewitness identification evidence.147  
Under Biggers and Brathwaite, the first step in the due process analysis is to 
consider whether police utilized an identification procedure that was unneces-
sarily or impermissibly suggestive.148  Even if so, however, under the second 
step in the analysis, the identification might nonetheless be admissible if, 
despite the suggestiveness, the identification was, in the court’s estimation, 
sufficiently reliable.149 
Constitutionally based judicial oversight under this legal architecture 
generally has been a failure.150  The Court has hesitated to wade too deeply 
into regulating police investigation practices, no doubt due to a sense that it 
lacks institutional competence in policing matters.151  In part, its reluctance 
also stems from recognition of its institutional limitations in another respect – 
the Court’s only real tool for regulating eyewitness evidence is to exclude 
eyewitness testimony.  The Court is unwilling to use that tool too broadly, 
 
 140. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 141. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
 142. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). 
 143. IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 38, at 23. 
 144. 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
 145. 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) (holding use of an unnecessarily suggestive photo 
array did not require exclusion of the resulting identification because “indicators of 
[the witness’] ability to make an accurate identification [were] hardly outweighed by 
the corrupting effect of the challenged identification”). 
 146. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
 147. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 98 (declaring that “[r]eliability [of the eyewitness 
identification] is the linchpin” of that evaluation). 
 148. Id. at 107. 
 149. Id. at 106–108. 
 150. See O’Toole, supra note 79. 
 151. For a thoughtful discussion of the Court’s institutional limitations as a regu-
lator of police, see Harmon, supra note 139, at 772–76. 
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recognizing that, while excluding eyewitness testimony might protect against 
some false evidence, it will also inevitably prevent juries from hearing accu-
rate evidence.  Reflecting this disinclination to keep too much eyewitness 
evidence from the jury, the Court in 2012, in Perry v. New Hampshire, wrote, 
“[o]ur unwillingness to enlarge the domain of due process . . . rests, in part, 
on our recognition that the jury, not the judge, traditionally determines the 
reliability of evidence.”152 
Moreover, to the extent the Court has imposed due process standards, 
those standards have proven ineffectual because the criteria the Court adopted 
for assessing reliability are empirically invalid.  The Court declared that, in 
assessing reliability, the factors to consider usually include: (1) the opportuni-
ty of the witness to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime, (2) the wit-
ness’s degree of attention at the time of the crime, (3) the accuracy of the 
witness’s prior description of the perpetrator, (4) the level of certainty 
demonstrated by the witness, and (5) the time between the crime and identifi-
cation.153  The social science research shows, however, that most of those 
factors are not good indicators of reliability and, because they are mostly self-
reported by the witness, are in fact distorted by the very suggestiveness they 
are meant to assess and overcome.154 
The court revisited the Biggers/Brathwaite standard for the first time 
thirty-five years later, in 2012, in Perry v. New Hampshire.155  While reform-
ers hoped the Court would take this opportunity to update the due process 
standard to align it with the developments in social science research, the 
Court instead reiterated the flawed Biggers/Brathwaite five-part reliability 
test.156  Indeed, rather than sharpen constitutional oversight of flawed eyewit-
ness evidence based on the growing body of research, the Court carved out 
large segments of eyewitness evidence that are entirely exempt from constitu-
tional regulation.  The Court held that the due process inquiry is triggered 
only after improper police conduct.157  Thus, the Due Process Clause offers 
no protection against inherently suggestive eyewitness identification circum-
stances so long as they were not directly created by law enforcement.  Given 
all of these limitations, eyewitness evidence is almost never excluded, even 
when the procedures used are highly suggestive. 
 
 152. 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012). 
 153. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 
(1972)). 
 154. Wells et al., Why Do Motions to Suppress Suggestive Eyewitness Identifica-
tions Fail?, supra note 30, at 169–73. 
 155. 132 S. Ct. 716. 
 156. Id. at 725 n.5. 
 157. Id. at 726 (“The due process check for reliability, Brathwaite made plain, 
comes into play only after the defendant establishes improper police conduct.”). 
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B.  State Court Interventions 
A few state courts have been more responsive to the social science re-
search and have demanded more as a matter of state law.  For example, in 
2005, the same year that the Wisconsin legislature passed its eyewitness iden-
tification legislation and the State Attorney General issued a science-based 
model eyewitness identification policy, the Wisconsin Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the Biggers/Brathwaite test should continue to govern admis-
sibility of one-on-one showup evidence.158  Citing the social science research, 
the court in State v. Dubose declared that “[t]hese studies confirm that eye-
witness testimony is often ‘hopelessly unreliable.’”159  The court held that the 
Biggers/Brathwaite approach, which permits admission of identification evi-
dence even if produced by impermissibly suggestive procedures “if the iden-
tification could be said to be reliable,” was untenable.160  The court explained: 
“Studies have now shown that approach is unsound, since it is extremely dif-
ficult, if not impossible, for courts to distinguish between identifications that 
were reliable and identifications that were unreliable.”161  Accordingly, the 
court held that, under the state constitution, admissibility of showup evidence 
would be assessed simply on the basis of whether police employed unneces-
sary suggestiveness; no showing of purported “reliability” could compen-
sate.162 
That approach suggested real potential to push law enforcement to adopt 
the social-science-based reforms.  Under the new paradigm, after all, any-
thing short of “best practices” could be deemed unnecessarily suggestive, 
rendering the evidence inadmissible.  But the limits of judicial action as a 
reform tool quickly revealed themselves once again.163  In subsequent cases, 
the Wisconsin courts limited Dubose to showup evidence, rendering it inap-
plicable to photo arrays, live lineups, or other identification procedures.164  
Although the rationale in Dubose was equally applicable to these other types 
of identification procedures, the courts proved once again unwilling to intrude 
too directly into police practices or to prescribe a rule that might result in 
excluding some potentially probative evidence. 
Six years later, New Jersey’s Supreme Court even more thoroughly in-
corporated the social science research into legal doctrine under the state con-
 
 158. State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005). 
 159. Id. at 592 (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 
(Mass. 1995)). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 593–94. 
 163. The limits of courts as change-agents in the innocence context were noted by 
Marvin Zalman and Julia Carrano when they wrote that, “because of its constitutional 
foundation and institutional conservatism, the judiciary has made few substantial 
institutional changes as a result of the innocence movement.”  Zalman & Carrano, 
supra note 11, at 980. 
 164. See State v. Drew, 740 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). 
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stitution.165  In 2011, in State v. Henderson, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
engaged in a deep analysis of the scientific evidence and determined that the 
framework then used by the state was inadequate for analyzing the reliability 
of eyewitness identification.166  Drawing on the scientific research, the court 
listed a number of system variables167 that courts should consider when de-
ciding whether there is enough evidence of suggestiveness to trigger suppres-
sion of an eyewitness identification.168  Then, on July 19, 2012, just six 
months after the U.S. Supreme Court demurred on its opportunity to reform 
constitutional standards in Perry v. New Hampshire,169 the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey reaffirmed its commitment to eyewitness identification reform by 
releasing expanded jury instructions and court rules addressing eyewitness 
identification.170  While the court did not mandate that police use any particu-
lar procedures, the court’s heavy focus on the social science research as a 
basis for regulating admissibility suggested a new era of judicial enforcement 
of science-based best practices. 
While the Supreme Court of New Jersey was the first state supreme 
court to reject the Biggers/Brathwaite test in all identification cases,171 it was 
not the last.  Perhaps most dramatically, in 2012, the Supreme Court of Ore-
gon revised eyewitness identification law in State v. Lawson.172  In Lawson, 
as in Henderson in New Jersey, the Supreme Court of Oregon extensively 
canvassed the social science research and concluded that the Big-
gers/Brathwaite test was inadequate.173  The Lawson court went on to break 
 
 165. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
 166. Id. at 918–19. 
 167. In the taxonomy of eyewitness identification procedures, “system variables” 
are those conditions leading to an identification that the system (the police) can con-
trol, such as whether police use a photo array or live lineup, whether the procedure is 
blind, the nature of the instructions given to witnesses, whether the procedure is sim-
ultaneous or sequential, etc.  By contrast, “estimator variables” are those variables 
that are beyond the control of law enforcement, such as the lighting conditions at the 
time of the crime, the witness’s viewing distance, whether the identification is cross-
racial, etc.  See Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Var-
iables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1546 (1978). 
 168. The non-exhaustive list of system variables includes blind administration, 
pre-identifications, lineup construction, feedback, multiple viewings, showups, and 
private actors.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–21. 
 169. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (decided on January 11, 
2012). 
 170. Supreme Court Releases Eyewitness Identification Criteria for Criminal 
Cases, N.J. COURTS (July 19, 2012), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2012/
pr120719a.htm. 
 171. Karen Newirth, New Jersey Leads the Way on Eyewitness Identification 
Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT (July 23, 2012, 5:40 PM), http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/New_Jersey_Leads_the_Way_on_Eyewitness_Identification_
Reform.php. 
 172. 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012). 
 173. Id. at 685–88. 
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new ground in several respects.  First, unlike prior judicial analyses, the Law-
son court relied not on constitutional principles, but on the Oregon Rules of 
Evidence to impose constraints on eyewitness evidence and thereby to regu-
late police practices.174  Specifically, the court drew upon evidentiary rules 
limiting witnesses to testimony about matters on which they have personal 
knowledge (on the theory that a witness who cannot make a reliable identifi-
cation might lack personal knowledge),175 rules governing lay opinion testi-
mony (on the theory that an eyewitness identification represents the witness’s 
lay opinion), 176 and the rules requiring courts to balance the probative value 
of evidence against the risk it presents of unfair prejudice.177  Under those 
 
 174. Id. at 691. 
 175. OR. EVID. CODE, R. 602, like its federal counterpart, FED. R. EVID. 602, pro-
vides that “a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced suffi-
cient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”  OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.315.  The Court in Lawson held that  
 
[w]hen a criminal defendant raises that kind of evidentiary challenge in a pre-
trial motion to exclude eyewitness identification evidence, the proponent of 
the evidence (in that context, the state) must offer evidence showing both that 
the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe or otherwise personally 
perceive the facts to which the witness will testify, and did, in fact, observe or 
perceive them, thereby gaining personal knowledge of the facts. 
 
Lawson, 291 P.3d at 692. 
 176. Lawson, 291 P.3d at 692 (citing OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.405 (West 
2016)); see also FED. R. EVID. 701.  The Lawson Court reasoned that “[t]he ultimate 
conclusion in an eyewitness identification—i.e., that a defendant on trial is the same 
person that the witness saw at the scene—cannot itself be observed, but rather must 
be inferred by the witness.”  Id.  These rules generally require the proponent of lay 
opinion testimony to establish that the proposed testimony is both rationally based on 
the witness’s perceptions and helpful to the trier of fact.  On the former requirement, 
“To satisfy its burden, the proponent of the identification evidence (generally the 
state) must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the witness perceived 
sufficient facts to support an inference of identification and that the identification 
was, in fact, based on those perceptions.”  Id. at 693.  On the latter requirement (help-
fulness to the jury), the Court wrote: 
 
Although we anticipate that that burden will be easily satisfied in nearly all 
cases, it is conceivable that some statements of identification might not be par-
ticularly helpful to a jury.  Consider, for example, the witness who observes a 
masked perpetrator with prominently scarred or tattooed hands.  Although 
those features could be distinctive enough to provide a rational basis for an in-
ference of identification, a jury may be equally capable of making the same 
inference by comparing the witness’s description of those markings to objec-
tive evidence of the actual markings on the defendant. 
 
Id. at 693–94. 
 177. Id. at 694 (citing OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.160); see also FED. R. EVID. 403.  
Other courts have similarly held that the balancing test of Rule 403 can and should be 
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rules, the court held, eyewitness evidence is only admissible – as based on 
personal knowledge, constituting valid lay opinions, and possessing sufficient 
probity – if it is sufficiently reliable as measured by social-science-based 
standards.  Significantly, the court held that this obligation arises whether the 
suggestiveness and unreliability was produced by factors the police could 
control (system variables) or factors entirely beyond control of the govern-
ment (estimator variables).178  The standard thus governs all eyewitness iden-
tification evidence, regardless of its source. 
A few other state supreme courts have also recognized the problem and 
inadequacy of the Biggers/Brathwaite test, but have moved toward reform 
more tentatively.  As noted, both the Supreme Court of Florida179 and the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court180 appointed study groups or task 
forces to study the problem of eyewitness identification error and make rec-
ommendations for, as the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court put it, how 
the courts can “most effectively deter unnecessarily suggestive identification 
procedures and minimize the risk of a wrongful conviction.”181 
The Massachusetts Study Group examined whether the Supreme Judi-
cial Court should require some of the best practices, including providing 
proper witness instructions, recording witness confidence statements, and 
utilizing a minimum of five fillers and only one suspect per procedure.182  
The Massachusetts Study Group released its report on July 25, 2013, and 
recommended that the court: 
(1) take judicial notice as legislative facts of certain generally estab-
lished modern psychological principles regarding eyewitness memory; 
(2) support uniform statewide procedures to ensure that all Massachu-
setts police departments employ best practices; 
(3) provide the basis for an expanded pretrial judicial inquiry into the 
reliability of eyewitness evidence and an expanded array of remedies 
beyond those available for identifications involving suggestive police 
practices; 
 
used to weigh the admissibility of unreliable eyewitness identification evidence.  See, 
e.g., State v. Hibl, 714 N.W.2d 194, 204 (Wis. 2006). 
 178. Lawson, 291 P.3d at 694. 
 179. FLA. DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 137, at 2. 
 180. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STUDY GROUP ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra 
note 138. 
 181. Id. (quoting Letter from Roderick L. Ireland, Chief Justice, to Barbara J. 
Rouse, Superior Court Chief Justice (Oct. 17, 2011)). 
 182. The Court had previously urged police to employ those practices.  See Com-
monwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 906 N.E.2d 299, 312 (Mass. 2009); Commonwealth v. 
Walker, 953 N.E.2d 195, 208 (Mass. 2011). 
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(4) adopt new and expanded jury instructions on eyewitness evidence; 
and 
(5) establish a committees for educating and training judges and the 
bar about the new procedures and for monitoring the evolving science 
of eyewitness evidence.183 
The following year, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided 
two cases in which it advanced the eyewitness identification reform agenda.  
First, in Commonwealth v. Crayton, the court established a heightened admis-
sibility standard for in-court eyewitness identification evidence where the 
eyewitness had not participated before trial in an identification procedure.184  
In that situation, the court held that the eyewitness’s in-court identification 
shall be treated as an in-court showup and, thus, only admitted for “good rea-
son.”185  Then in Commonwealth v. Gomes, the court updated jury instruc-
tions on eyewitness identification to incorporate “generally accepted” scien-
tific principles such as: 
(1) human memory does not function like a video recording; 
(2) an eyewitness’s expressed certainty in an identification, standing 
alone, may not indicate the accuracy of the identification; 
(3) high levels of stress can reduce an eyewitness’s ability to make an 
accurate identification; 
(4) information that is unrelated to the initial viewing of the event, 
which an eyewitness receives before or after making an identification, 
can influence the witness’s later recollection of the memory or of the 
identification; and 
(5) a prior viewing of a suspect at an identification procedure may re-
duce the reliability of a subsequent identification procedure in which 
the same suspect is shown.186 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued finalized model jury in-
structions based on Gomes’s provisional instructions in 2015.187 
 
 183. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STUDY GROUP ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra 
note 138, at 2–5. 
 184. 21 N.E.3d 157, 169–70 (Mass. 2014). 
 185. Id. at 169. 
 186. Commonwealth v. Gomez, 22 N.E.3d 897, 911–16 (Mass.), modified, Com-
monwealth v. Bastaldo, 32 N.E.3d 873 (Mass. 2015). 
 187. Statement, Mass. Supreme Judicial Court, Model Jury Instructions on Eye-
witness Identification (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/
model-jury-instructions-on-eyewitness-identification-november-2015.pdf. 
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As this brief description of recent eyewitness identification case law re-
veals, a few jurisdictions have demonstrated the potential for courts to de-
mand significant reform.  But the vast majority of courts, led by the U.S. Su-
preme Court, remain largely unresponsive to the lessons from social science.  
Whether that inactivity reflects enduring institutional limitations on the courts 
as regulators of police practices, or merely the conservative nature of courts, 
which will eventually give way under the weight of scientific evidence, is still 
an open question.  Likewise, whether courts in New Jersey and Oregon will 
vigorously enforce science-based “best practices” under Henderson and Law-
son remains to be seen.  As the Wisconsin experience demonstrates (the swift 
retreat from the broad promise of Dubose by limiting it to showups), the 
courts are quite sensitive to pressures against moving too quickly in the area 
of police reform.188 
IV.  BEYOND THE COURTS: LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING REFORM 
At least thirteen state legislatures have enacted some form of eyewitness 
identification reform.189  These reforms range from strict, top-down, “com-
mand and control” legislation that mandates one uniform statewide policy to 
more flexible, bottom-up legislation that mandates that each agency have a 
policy, but allows each agency to adopt the specific procedures it sees fit.  
This Article analyzes in greatest depth the latter approach, especially as at-
tempted in Wisconsin and a few other states, which might be characterized as 
an experiment in “new governance” or “democratic experimentalism.”  But 
before analyzing that approach, it is important to outline the alternatives that 
have been tried in other states. 
A.  Top-Down Prescriptive Legislation 
1.  The Mandates 
At least nine states – Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Mary-
land, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, and Vermont190 – have experimented 
with governmental mandates that spell out – at least to some degree – the 
specific procedures that police must employ when obtaining eyewitness iden-
 
 188. See, e.g., State v. Drew, 740 N.W.3d 404, 408–09 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). 
 189. These states include Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, 
Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wis-
consin.  See infra notes 191–92 and accompanying text. 
 190. Arguably, Texas could be added to this list because of its legislative provi-
sion that, essentially, agencies that choose not to adopt their own written policies will 
be bound by the policy created by the Law Enforcement Management Institute of 
Texas (“LEMIT”).  See infra notes 273–75 and accompanying text. 
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tifications.191  Under this “command and control” model, police are directed 
specifically on how to conduct their identification procedures – typically in-
cluding specific requirements that police employ “best practices,” such as 
blind sequential procedures.192  While in eight of these states the command-
and-control model has been implemented by legislatures, in one, New Jersey, 
the Attorney General had the authority, which he exercised in 2001, to man-
date a set of best practices procedures. 193 The others – the legislative man-
dates – are described below. 
North Carolina.  Spurred in part by one of the nation’s most high-profile 
misidentification cases involving Jennifer Thompson and Ronald Cotton,194 
and by the leadership of Supreme Court Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake, whose 
conservative ideals led him to recoil at the notion of the government depriv-
ing an innocent person of his liberty,195 North Carolina became the first state 
to mandate these procedures by legislation.  After the North Carolina De-
partment of Justice, in 2005, experimented with non-mandatory model poli-
cies,196 the North Carolina legislature enacted the Eyewitness Identification 
Reform Act in 2007, which made mandatory many of the previously recom-
mended procedures, including requirements that identification procedures be 
blind and sequential, that witnesses should be given the instructions recom-
mended by the 1999 NIJ guide, that fillers should fit the description of the 
perpetrator, that a confidence statement should be documented at the time of 
the identification, and that the identification procedure should be videotaped 
whenever practical.197 
 
 191. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-1p (West 2016) (“Not later than May 
1, 2013, each municipal police department and the Department of Emergency Ser-
vices and Public Protection shall adopt procedures for the conducting of photo lineups 
and live lineups that are in accordance with the policies and guidelines developed and 
promulgated by the Police Officer Standards and Training Council and the Division 
of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services . . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 15A-284.52 (West 2016) (“Lineups conducted by State, county, and other 
local law enforcement officers shall . . . be conducted by an independent administrator 
[and] be presented to witnesses sequentially.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.83 
(West 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1E-2 (West 2016) (imposing mandatory proce-
dures for eyewitness identifications); 2015 Ga. Laws 173. 
 192. Supra note 191. 
 193. See N.J. ATT’Y GEN. GUIDELINES, supra note 36. 
 194. Jennifer Thompson’s misidentification of Ronald Cotton was featured in 
numerous national media stories and ultimately in a best-selling book the two co-
authored.  JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANINO, RONALD COTTON & ERIN TORNEO, PICKING 
COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009). 
 195. See Keith A. Findley & Larry Golden, The Innocence Movement, the Inno-
cence Network, and Policy Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 93, 100. 
 196. See N.C. ACTUAL INNOCENCE COMM’N, supra note 35. 
 197. Eyewitness Identification Reform Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.50–
.53 (West 2016). 
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Ohio.  Thereafter, Ohio similarly adopted mandatory language requiring 
that police comply with a set of specific procedures.198  Ohio’s statute de-
mands that “any law enforcement agency or criminal justice entity in this 
state that conducts live lineups or photo lineups shall adopt specific proce-
dures for conducting the lineups.”199  The statute then requires that “[t]he 
procedures, at a minimum, shall impose the following requirements . . . .  
Unless impracticable, a blind or blinded administrator.”200   The statute does 
not list sequential administration as a “specific procedure” but does define the 
“folder system” as “a system for conducting a photo line-up” that employs 
double-blind, sequential administration.201 
Connecticut.  A few other states have now adopted legislative mandates 
as well.  In 2012, the Connecticut Eyewitness Task Force issued a report rec-
ommending that the blind sequential procedure be made mandatory, at least 
when practical.202  Subsequent legislation watered down the recommendation 
and adopted the mandate for blind administration where practical, but not the 
sequential procedure, pending further research.203  The statute requires law 
enforcement agencies to adopt procedures for photo and live lineups that 
comply with minimum standard best practices, including proper filler selec-
tion.204 
Georgia.  After several years of wrangling, Georgia also adopted a pre-
scriptive law.205  The process began in 2008 when the Georgia House of Rep-
resentatives passed a resolution urging all law enforcement agencies to either 
revisit or develop policies and procedures for eyewitness identification.206   
At that point, one review of the state’s law enforcement agencies reported 
that less than ten percent had written policies in place.207  When that approach 
failed to produce sufficient results, and after a protracted period of negotia-
 
 198. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.83 (West 2016) (mandating double-blind and 
sequential procedures). 
 199. Id. § 2933.83(B). 
 200. Id. § 2933.83(B)(1). 
 201. Id. § 2933.83(A)(6). 
 202. EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE OF THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY (Feb. 8, 2012), 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/how-is-your-state-
doing/CT_Eyewitness_Identification_Task_Force_Report_February_2012.pdf. 
 203. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-1p (West 2016). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Eyewitness ID Powerpoint, GA. POLICE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING 
COUNCIL, https://www.gapost.org/eyewitness_training.html (select “Eyewitness ID 
Powerpoint”) (last visited Feb. 21, 2016). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id.; see also Georgia Improves Identification Training, INNOCENCE PROJECT 
(Jan. 21, 2009, 1:49 PM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Georgia_
Improves_Identification_Training.php (noting that a 2007 study by the Georgia Inno-
cence Project reported eighty-two percent of Georgia law enforcement agencies had 
no eyewitness identification procedures in place). 
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tion and debate,208 the legislature adopted a statute that required law enforce-
ment agencies to have written eyewitness identification policies by July 
2016.209  The new statute, which went into effect July 1, 2015, requires these 
policies to contain best practices, including blind administration, proper filler 
selection, witness instructions, and confidence statements.210 
Maryland. Following what was perhaps an even more arduous journey, 
Maryland similarly adopted a prescriptive law after it became clear that law 
enforcement, left to its own devices, was not responding to encouragement to 
develop best practices policies.211  Ultimately, the Maryland legislature 
amended its statute in 2014 to read in part: 
On or before January 1, 2016, each law enforcement agency in the 
State shall . . . adopt the Police Training Commission’s Eyewitness 
Identification Model Policy; or . . . adopt and implement a written pol-
 
 208. Georgia adopted its training program directly in response to impending legis-
lation.  To help facilitate law enforcement action, the Georgia Public Safety Training 
Center developed an eight-hour course on eyewitness identification.  Georgia Im-
proves Identification Training, supra note 207.  “The goal of [this] increased focus on 
the eyewitness identification training is to reduce the potential of error in our identifi-
cation processes.”  Eyewitness ID Powerpoint, supra note 205. 
 209. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-20-2 (West 2016). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Reformers in Maryland first tried, in 2007, to enact a prescriptive eyewitness 
identification law that would have mandated double-blind-sequential procedures with 
appropriate witness instructions and fillers, along with recording of confidence state-
ments and other elements of the typical reform packages.  MD. CODE ANN., PUB. 
SAFETY § 3-506 (West 2016); Brown & Saloom, supra note, 17, at 553.  At that time, 
many police departments in the state had no written eyewitness identification policies 
“and many of the written policies that did exist had not been modified in decades.”  
Id.  Remarkably, “[N]o agency had adopted a written protocol that incorporated the 
core best practices that experts have identified as critical to reducing mistaken identi-
fications.”  Id. at 554.  When it became clear that the supporters would not be able to 
overcome opposition from law enforcement, reformers regrouped and succeeded in 
passing a bill in 2007 requiring all law enforcement agencies to adopt written policies 
that minimally comport with the recommendations issued by the National Institute of 
Justice’s Technical Working Group on Eyewitness Evidence.  Id.  Despite this legisla-
tion, a 2011–2012 review of law enforcement policies in Maryland revealed that no 
agency had adopted the double-blind-sequential protocol, and that there was “a com-
plete lack of uniformity throughout the state in terms of what particular aspects of the 
eyewitness identification procedure were addressed by the policies.”  Id. at 555.  Ne-
gotiations resumed, producing a collaboration between stakeholders designed to pro-
mote uniform best practices, and a directive from the legislature for a status report on 
the results of this collaboration in advance of the next legislative session.  Id. at 557.  
Although the Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commission drafted a poli-
cy incorporating the best practices, a preliminary analysis conducted by the Innocence 
Project in 2013 found that only one-third of agencies responded to the directive to 
submit policies, and of those, “only half required the use of a blind administrator, the 
single most important reform to eyewitness protocols.”  Id. at 558. 
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icy relating to identification procedures that complies with § 3-506.1 
of this subtitle; and . . . file a copy of the written policy with the De-
partment of State Police.212   
At minimum, these policies must include blind administration, witness in-
structions, proper filler procedure, and written confidence statements.213 
Illinois.  Illinois enacted a similar statute, effective January 1, 2015, re-
quiring law enforcement agencies to adopt best practices, including: blind 
administration, witness instructions, proper filler selection, and recording of 
the procedures.214  The law also provides a remedy from failure to comply 
with identification procedures, including suppression of eyewitness identifi-
cation evidence and a curative jury instruction.215 
Colorado.  Colorado adopted a law effective July 1, 2015, that requires 
all Colorado law enforcement agencies to implement eyewitness identifica-
tion best practices such as confidence statements, blind administration, and 
witness instructions.216 
Vermont.  Taking a slightly different approach, Vermont adopted legis-
lation that constitutes somewhat of a hybrid approach between the “command 
and control” approach and the “new governance” approach discussed below.  
In 2014, Vermont adopted a statute related to “law enforcement policies on 
eyewitness identification and bias-free policing.”217  The law requires all state 
and county law enforcement agencies to adopt an eyewitness identification 
policy.218   The bill does not mandate any particular policy, but does require 
that the policy contain, at minimum, certain “essential elements,” including 
protocols for showups, blind administration of photo and live lineups, witness 
instructions that inform the witness the perpetrator may not be present, at 
least five fillers for photo lineups and four fillers for live lineups, a require-
ment that all fillers must match the description of the perpetrator, and docu-
mentation of the witness’s confidence “in the eyewitness’s own words.”219  I 
characterize this as a hybrid approach because it requires agencies to adopt a 
policy based on best practices, but also leaves room for agencies to craft 
modification and adjustments according to their needs.  Senate Bill 184 also 
dictates that the model policy developed by the Law Enforcement Advisory 
 
 212. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-506. 
 213. Id. § 3-506.1. 
 214. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/107A-2 (West 2016). 
 215. Id. 5/107A-2(j). 
 216. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1-109 (West 2016). 
 217. Vermont Senate Bill 184, LEGISCAN, http://legiscan.com/VT/text/S0184/2013 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2015); see also VT Governor to Sign into Law New Wrongful 
Conviction Reforms, INNOCENCE PROJECT (June 16, 2014, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/vt-governor-to-sign-into-law-new-wrongful-
conviction-reforms/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016). 
 218. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5581(a) (West 2016). 
 219. Id. § 5581(b). 
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Board, which includes the core best practices, will be an agency’s default if 
the agency does not adopt its own policy by January 1, 2015.220 
2.  Assessing the Top-Down Approach 
The advantage of the top-down, command-and-control model is, obvi-
ously, that it can dictate best practices and can put the force of law behind 
those dictates.  As policy advocates with the Innocence Project explain: 
There are obvious benefits to legislating police practice reform.  A 
clear advantage of a statute is that it assures uniformity and consisten-
cy in expectations of practice across a given state and accomplishes 
this goal promptly, rather than uneven implementation over a protract-
ed period of time.  Another benefit legislation can offer is its ability to 
provide clear direction to the courts about how to consider eyewitness 
evidence that has been gathered in violation of best practices.  Finally, 
legislation can provide law enforcement with both the resources and 
direction for necessary training for improved eyewitness identification 
protocols.221 
Given police resistance to nudges toward reform, exhibited for example by 
the Georgia and Maryland experiences with voluntary policies, the heavy 
hand of top-down mandates might be required, at least in some instances.  
The Innocence Project, for its part, prefers to work with local law enforce-
ment in a collaborative effort to reform practices, but when that fails, it views 
mandatory legislation as a necessary alternative.222 
But there are drawbacks to the top-down model.  First, because it re-
quires engagement of the political process, and because police and prosecu-
tors often resist and have political clout, adopting such legislation is not polit-
ically feasible in many jurisdictions.  One reason states like Wisconsin have 
gone the route of directing police to develop their own policies, rather than 
mandating that they follow legislatively prescribed policies, is that there was 
little political will in the legislature to impose heavy-handed or intrusive 
mandates on police.223 
 
 220. Id. § 5581(d). 
 221. Brown & Saloom, supra note 17, at 550. 
 222. Id. (“Having first sought to arrive at eyewitness identification reform by 
supporting law enforcement in their efforts to implement it themselves, when we must 
turn to legislation we are able to do so with a measure of understanding, and hopeful-
ly respect, from the law enforcement leaders with whom we had engaged.”). 
 223. Kruse, supra note 24, at 713 (citing Interview with Mark Gundrum, Wis. 
State Assembly Representative (Feb. 6, 2006)).  The Wisconsin statute was the prod-
uct of compromise and a delicate political strategy engineered by then-Representative 
Mark Gundrum, chairperson of a legislative task force created to recommend reforms 
to prevent wrongful convictions.  Id.  Gundrum, a self-proclaimed conservative, law-
40
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss2/6
2016] IMPLEMENTING THE LESSONS  417 
Second, because the best practices are based on social science research, 
and that research is continually evolving and developing, there is some con-
cern that writing any particular procedures into a statute freezes the current 
state of the science and makes future research-based reform more difficult.224 
Third, because legislation is typically drafted at a fairly general level, 
legislative mandates tend to be less specific, and hence to some degree less 
helpful, than agency-developed policies and procedures.225  In this sense, 
rules for conducting eyewitness identification procedures share the character-
istics of other administrative agency rules and rule-making processes.  Ad-
ministrative rules are typically relied upon where the requirements for exper-
tise, flexibility, and specificity exceed what can be expected to emerge from 
the political legislative process.226 
Despite these limitations, a number of states have adopted top-down leg-
islation that is quite remarkable in its specificity.  Several statutes mandate 
the use of blind sequential procedures; provide detailed instructions on 
“blinding” the process by use of such things as the folder shuffle system;227 
require specified, unbiased witness instructions; provide specific directions 
that fillers should be selected to fit the description of the perpetrator and cho-
sen so they do not make the suspect stand out; prescribe the number of fillers 
to be utilized; require prompt recording of witnesses responses and confi-
dence statements; and permit no more than one suspect per lineup.228  The 
statutes are far more specific than many policies adopted by law enforcement 
agencies on their own. 
But statutes can only go so far; there is inevitably a limit to the specifici-
ty and depth of legislation.  Written agency policies have no such inherent 
constraints.  The Wisconsin Department of Justice Model Policy and Proce-
dure, for example, in its longest form (it was promulgated in several forms), 
consumes twenty-eight pages, and is broader and deeper than any legisla-
 
and-order Republican, “knew that gaining the buy-in of hard-line law enforcement 
was going to be the key to political success for any proposed legislative reforms.”  Id. 
 224. Id. at 719. 
 225. Id. at 676–77. 
 226. Id. at 673. 
 227. In the folder shuffle system, each of the suspect and filler photographs is 
placed in a separate manila folder.  “The Folder System”: A Recommended Practice 
for the ‘Blind’ Administration of Eyewitness Procedures For Small Police Depart-
ments With Limited Resources, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://goo.gl/iscfEr (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2016).  The folders are then shuffled, two or more empty folders are placed at 
the bottom, and the stack is presented to the witness, who opens and examines the 
photographs one at a time in such a way that the police administrator cannot see 
which photograph the witness is observing.  Id.  In this way, even if the detective 
knows who the suspect is, the detective cannot unintentionally cue the witnesses 
when the witness looks at the suspect’s photo.  Id. 
 228. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52 (West 2016); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2933.83 (West 2016) (although Ohio does not mandate sequential pro-
cedures). 
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tion.229  It provides recommendations on all of the major best practices out-
lined above, plus others, including specific instructions on topics such as the 
use of composite sketches and showups.230  And, significantly, it lays out the 
rationale and underlying science for each of the recommendations to help 
police better understand and accept the procedures set forth.231 
This last point suggests a fourth limitation on top-down legislative ap-
proaches.  Police culture is notoriously resistant to criticism and change from 
outside.  Police tend to be insular organizations, whose members value soli-
darity and a shared identity, exemplified by such things as the “code of si-
lence,” the unwritten rule that prevents one officer from testifying against or 
exposing another officer’s wrongdoing.232  As one police scholar has put it, 
“[t]he insularity of police institutions and the solidarity of rank-and-file po-
lice officers create an impervious shield around these institutions.” 233  Polic-
ing tends to engender an “us vs. them” mentality in the relationship between 
police and the communities they serve, as well as between the police and 
those in governance above them.  “The embattled police--the ‘insiders’--view 
‘outsiders’ as ‘the enemies who are assaulting . . . the “brothers” on the 
force.’”234  Hence, “The rank-and-file officers abhor being second-guessed by 
inexperienced bureaucrats unfamiliar with the challenges that the officers 
face on a daily basis.”235 
This culture might help explain why, as discussed below, in jurisdictions 
like Wisconsin and Virginia, where police are free to determine their own 
written policies, they are more likely to adopt sequential procedures than 
blind administration, even though the science on the latter is more settled.236  
Adopting sequential procedures requires some willingness by police to accept 
that there is a better way to achieve their goals than they have employed in 
the past.  While that might be an unwelcome message to some, it pales in 
comparison to what many perceive as the insult of requiring blind procedures.  
Anecdotally, the response of many police to the requirement for blind proce-
dures is to take offense, misunderstanding the requirement as a reflection of 
distrust in the detectives who administer lineups rather than a response to the 
 
 229. WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31. 
 230. Id. at 28. 
 231. Id. at 3–6. 
 232. See David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 
HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 465, 481 & n.60 (1992) (discussing the unwritten “code of 
silence”). 
 233. Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Po-
lice Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 
373, 378 (2010). 
 234. Id. at 383 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive 
Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusonary Rule, 
76 MISS. L.J. 483, 555 (2006)). 
 235. Id. at 410. 
 236. See infra note 318, and accompanying text. 
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human condition, and a fundamental tenet of any type of sound testing proto-
col. 
Given this culture – and the basic human tendencies it reflects – reforms 
might be more readily accepted if the rank-and-file can be brought on board, 
either through training or by being given a voice in creating the policies.  As 
Herman Goldstein, one of the pioneers of modern policing scholarship, wrote 
more than thirty-five years ago about police reform in general: 
Traditional programs to improve the police—labeled as efforts to 
“change,” “upgrade,” or “reform” the police or to “achieve minimum 
standards”—require that police officers openly acknowledge their own 
deficiencies.  Rank-and-file officers are much more likely to support 
an innovation that is cast in the form of a new response to an old prob-
lem—a problem with which they have struggled for many years and 
which they would like to see handled more effectively.237 
No one has yet studied police compliance with legislative top-down 
eyewitness identification mandates.  It may be that police are implementing 
the mandates fully and effectively.  But we know from other contexts – such 
as the Miranda requirements – that police can become facile at circumventing 
mandates they do not like, either overtly or through more subtle manipula-
tions.238  It is therefore possible that, while the legislative mandates make 
good “law on the books,” they are not as effective as “law on the streets.”  
Indeed, initial anecdotal evidence suggests that, in some places at least, police 
may not be complying widely with the requirements of such eyewitness iden-
tification statutes.239 
The Ohio experience with mandates illustrates this point.  The Ohio 
statute, which was adopted in a context that did not involve the kind of law 
 
 237. Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25 
CRIME & DELINQ. 236, 258 (1979). 
 238. See DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 195, 196 
(1991) (describing ploys used by police to get suspects to waive their Miranda 
rights); Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops Ques-
tion Kids, 23 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 424 (2013) (describing tactics police 
use “to waive Miranda without alerting them to its significance or consequences”); 
Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 259 (1996) (after Miranda, “American police have become 
skilled at the practice of manipulation and deception during interrogation”); Robert P. 
Mosteller, Police Deception Before Miranda Warnings: The Case for Per Se Prohibi-
tion of an Entirely Unjustified Practice at the Most Critical Moment, 39 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 1239 (2007); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 
109, 154–62 (1998) (describing the police practice of interrogating “outside Miran-
da”). 
 239. E-mail from Mark Godsey, Daniel P. and Judith L. Carmichael Professor of 
Law, Univ. of Cincinnati Coll. of Law & Dir., Rosenthal Instit. for Justice/Ohio Inno-
cence Project, to author (Jan. 21, 2015) (on file with author). 
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enforcement collaboration that has existed in other states,240 does not explicit-
ly require sequential procedures, but does include provisions on how to con-
duct photo lineups using the folder shuffle system – a system whose only 
purpose is to make identification procedures both functionally blinded and 
sequential.  Nonetheless, some Ohio law enforcement agencies have inter-
preted the sequential “folder system” portion of the statute as a suggestion, 
not a “preferred method.”241  This decision is bolstered by a statement from 
Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine that “[t]he state legislature did not say 
that the ‘folder method is preferred.’  There is nowhere in the statute does it 
say that.”242  However, at least one Ohio Court of Appeals has found that the 
legislature has expressed a “clear preference” for the folder system.243  De-
spite this opinion, at least some of Ohio’s law enforcement agencies still use 
the “six-pack” (simultaneous) method.244 
The point is obvious: one possible drawback to legislatively mandated 
eyewitness identification practices is that they may lack police buy-in, which 
can undermine their effectiveness.245  It is partly for this reason that some 
jurisdictions have attempted reform through less directive processes. 
B.  Ad Hoc Bottom-Up Reform 
One response is to encourage police to sort this all out for themselves.  
Indeed, in most jurisdictions, there simply is no organized statewide effort to 
implement “best practices.”  That is not to say no reform is happening in 
those states.  Rather, that is to say that if reform is occurring, it is ad hoc and 
 
 240. Since the Ohio experience, trainings and symposia have been conducted with 
and for law enforcement in states as diverse as California, Georgia, Idaho, Maryland, 
Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, Washington, and others.  Email from Rebecca Brown, Poli-
cy Dir., the Innocence Project, to author (July 18, 2015). 
 241. See Not All Ohio Police Photo Line-Ups Follow New ‘Preferred’ Method, 
WBNS-10TV (Oct. 22, 2013, 10:44 AM), http://www.10tv.com/content/stories/2013/
10/22/columbus-photo-arrays.html. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id.; State v. Humberto, 963 N.E.2d 162, 176 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
 244. Not All Ohio Police Photo Line-Ups Follow New ‘Preferred’ Method, supra 
note 241. 
 245. Brown & Saloom, supra note 17, at 548.  It is indeed for this reason that the 
Policy Unit at the Innocence Project prefers to work with law enforcement to develop 
best practices policies, reserving legislative mandates for a last resort.  As Innocence 
Project policy personnel have written:  
 
[I]f police are using reform procedures because they actually embrace them, 
they will likely be employed properly and consistently.  We similarly recognize 
that if eyewitness identification reform is imposed without law enforcement 
participation and regardless of their legitimate concerns, the reality is that they 
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sporadic and almost entirely initiated by police in response to urging by re-
formers.  Indeed, an important paper from the Executive Sessions on Policing 
and Public Safety sponsored by the Harvard Kennedy School and the NIJ 
argues, “for strong leadership from police agencies to lead reviews of wrong-
ful convictions that can be learning experiences for all components of the 
criminal justice system.”246  Specifically included in that recommendation is a 
call for police to adopt the range of eyewitness identification best practices 
outlined above.247  That approach obviously solves the police buy-in problem.  
Unfortunately, to date, it has also meant that in most places not much has 
happened. 
The recent experience in California reveals the opportunities and chal-
lenges of this approach.  Work on eyewitness identification reform began in 
earnest in California after the California Commission on the Fair Administra-
tion of Justice took up the issue and produced a set of recommendations.248  
The Commission was created in 2004 by Senate Resolution 44, with a charge 
to study the criminal justice system in California and “determine the extent to 
which that process has failed in the past, resulting in wrongful executions or 
the wrongful conviction of innocent persons,” to examine potential “safe-
guards” and “improvements in the way the criminal justice system functions” 
and to make recommendations and proposals designed to “ensure that the 
application and administration of criminal justice in California is just, fair, 
and accurate.”249  Commission members were appointed by the Senate Com-
mittee on Rules and included stakeholders from all parts of the criminal jus-
tice system.250  In April 2006, the Commission issued its Report and Recom-
mendations Regarding Eye Witness Identification Procedures, which includ-
ed the full panoply of social-science-based recommended “best practices.”251  
The Commission also recommended legislation requiring the Attorney Gen-
eral to convene a task force to develop guidelines for policies, procedures, 
and training regarding eyewitness identification procedures, consistent with 
the Commission’s recommendations.252 
The legislature did indeed pass such legislation, but Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger vetoed it twice.253  In his veto message, Schwarzenegger 
asserted that even voluntary state guidelines would interfere with police de-
 
 246. Batts et al., supra note 11, at 2; see also id. at 5 (“We firmly believe that 
police departments are the best advocates to catalyze this kind of change . . . .”). 
 247. Id. at 8–13. 
 248. CAL. COMM’N ON FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 35. 
 249. Id.; S. Res. 44, Reg. Session. (Cal. 2004). 
 250. See Membership, CAL. COMMISSION ON FAIR ADMIN. JUST., http://www.ccfaj.
org/membership.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2016). 
 251. CAL. COMM’N ON FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 5–6. 
 252. Id. at 6–7. 
 253. Radley Balko, Schwarzenegger Vetoes Justice, FOXNEWS (Nov. 5, 2007), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/11/05/schwarzenegger-vetoes-justice/. 
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partments establishing their own lineup policies based on their “unique local 
conditions.”254 
That left eyewitness identification reform entirely up to local control 
and initiative, where it remains in California.  The results have been spotty.  
A few counties have led the way, but most have adopted no reforms.255  In 
2003, Santa Clara County became the first to adopt the double-blind-
sequential protocol, after the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office 
approached police with a proposal to adopt the new “best practices.” 256  Ac-
cording to former San Jose Police Captain Scott Seaman (now Police Chief in 
Los Gatos, California), the Assistant District Attorney who presented the idea 
had credibility with police and told them that the double-blind-sequential 
protocol was one of the reforms recommended by the California Commission 
on Fair Administration of Justice that he thought made sense.257  After a brief 
study, police in Santa Clara County agreed.258 
Nine years later, in 2012, Seaman became president of the California 
Association of Chiefs of Police (“CACP”).259  He arranged for representatives 
of the Northern California Innocence Project and the Innocence Project, along 
with law enforcement and social scientists, to present at a workshop for the 
state’s police chiefs, at which they explained the science behind the new pro-
cedures.  Seaman then made eyewitness identification reform part of his 
agenda.  Every time he spoke around the state, he talked about eyewitness 
reform, and he asked each police chief to work with his or her DA to consider 
making the reforms.  He told the chiefs, “[W]e’re either going to be asked to 
do it, or the legislature is going to tell us to do it.”260  Echoing a sentiment 
reflected by police elsewhere as well, Seaman said he would be prouder if 
police made the changes before they were forced to: “We take it as a badge of 
honor if we can get there without legislation.”261  He also talked to the 
 
 254. Id. 
 255. See Maurice Possley, Southern CA Exonerations Don’t Lead to Eyewitness 
ID Reforms, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://californiainnocenceproject.org/2013/
01/southern-ca-exonerations-dont-lead-to-eyewitness-id-reforms/ (last visited Feb. 21, 
2016). 
 256. Telephone Interview with Scott Seaman, Police Chief, Los Gatos/Monte 
Sereno, Cal., Police Dep’t, former Police Officer, San Jose, Cal., Police Dep’t (Feb. 
20, 2014). 
 257. Id. 
 258. See San Jose Mercury News: Santa Clara County DA Program Aims to 
Boost Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications, ALBERT COBARRUBIAS JUST. PROJECT 
(Feb. 9, 2012), http://acjusticeproject.org/2012/02/09/san-jose-mercury-news-santa-
clara-county-da-program-aims-to-boost-reliability-of-eyewitness-identifications/. 
 259. Chief Scott R. Seaman, POLICE FOUND., http://www.policefoundation.org/
team_detail/chief-scott-r-seaman/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016). 
 260. Telephone Interview with Scott Seaman, supra note 256. 
 261. Id.; see also Peter A. Modafferi et al., Eyewitness Identification: Views From 
the Trenches, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.policechief
magazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1926&
issue_id=102009 (“The consequences for inaction are not acceptable; decisions and 
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CACP’s Executive Board about the reforms, but he says the Board usually 
avoids setting “best practices” until there is really clear agreement on what 
the “best practices” are.  The Board asked him not to promote the reforms yet 
as “best practices,” so they would not have to vote on them; instead, the 
Board encouraged him to promote the reforms as “a promising practice.”262 
Seaman finished his term as president of the CACP in 2013, and since 
then, there has not been much movement in California.  As of 2014, only five 
of California’s fifty-eight counties had adopted the new procedures, and all 
five had done so within the preceding year or two, and all in Northern Cali-
fornia.263  Los Angeles County, in particular, has been resistant to the changes 
because the District Attorney is adamantly opposed.  Seaman predicts none-
theless that all California counties will come around eventually, including 
Los Angeles County, when enough DAs begin to pressure their colleagues.  
But even Seaman agrees the process will take time.  As he put it, “We’re tak-
ing a longer and more organic . . . approach [in California].”264 
C.  “Experimentalist” Bottom-up Approaches 
1.  The Statutes 
A few other states take a middle path, in which they mandate policies on 
eyewitness identification procedures, but refrain from prescribing to any sig-
nificant degree the specifics of those policies.  Wisconsin was among the first 
to take this approach. 
Wisconsin.  In 2005, the Wisconsin Legislature passed legislation, by 
unanimous vote, mandating that every law enforcement agency in the state 
adopt written policies and procedures governing eyewitness identifications.265  
More specifically, the law requires each agency to “adopt written policies for 
using an eyewitness to identify a suspect,” and it explicitly ties those policies 
to preventing wrongful convictions; the law requires that “[t]he policies shall 
be designed to reduce the potential for erroneous identifications by eyewit-
nesses in criminal cases.”266  Beyond that, the law permits local law enforce-
ment agencies to come up with their own policies, with whatever content they 
 
protocols will be decided for us by state or federal legislators and private interest 
groups.  The worst thing that we can do as leaders is stick our heads in the sand and 
hope that the problem will go away.  It won’t.  As leaders, we need to confront this 
issue head on.”). 
 262. Phone Interview with Scott Seaman, supra note 256. 
 263. The reform counties include Santa Clara, Alameda, San Francisco, San 
Mateo, and Placer.  Id.  Why those counties in particular have moved toward reform, 
and not others in California, is a question that itself deserves scholarly inquiry. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Assemb. B. 648, 97th Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005).  The reform bill is now codi-
fied in several sections of the Wisconsin Statutes.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.50 (West 
2016) (relating to eyewitness identification reform). 
 266. § 175.50(2). 
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choose, as long as they at least consider the social-science-based “best prac-
tices.”267  At the same time, then-Attorney General Peg Lautenschlager, 
through the Wisconsin Department of Justice’s Division of Law Enforcement 
Services, Training and Standards Bureau, issued a model policy and proce-
dure that incorporated the full complement of “best practices” recommenda-
tions.268 
Virginia.  That same year, 2005, Virginia adopted a more pared-down 
version of a similar law.  The Virginia legislation provides in its entirety: 
“The Department of State Police and each local police department and sher-
iff’s office shall establish a written policy and procedure for conducting in-
person and photographic lineups.”269  The statute provides no further guid-
ance.  In 2010, the Virginia Crime Commission proposed an amendment, 
H.B. 207, that would have required agencies to adopt written policies con-
sistent with best practices.270  The amendment failed to make it past the 
House Committee on Courts of Justice.271 
 
 267. Id. §§ 175.50(3)–(4).  The law provides: 
 
(4) In developing and revising policies under this section, a law enforcement 
agency shall consider model policies and policies adopted by other jurisdic-
tions. 
(5) A law enforcement agency shall consider including in policies adopted un-
der this section practices to enhance the objectivity and reliability of eyewit-
ness identifications and to minimize the possibility of mistaken identifications, 
including the following: 
(a) To the extent feasible, having a person who does not know the identity of 
the suspect administer the eyewitness’ viewing of individuals or representa-
tions. 
(b) To the extent feasible, showing individuals or representations sequentially 
rather than simultaneously to an eyewitness. 
(c) Minimizing factors that influence an eyewitness to identify a suspect or 
overstate his or her confidence level in identifying a suspect, including verbal 
or nonverbal reactions of the person administering the eyewitness’ viewing of 
individuals or representations. 
(d) Documenting the procedure by which the eyewitness views the suspect or 
a representation of the suspect and documenting the results or outcome of the 
procedure. 
 
Id. §§ 175.50(4)–(5). 
 268. WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31. 
 269. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.02 (West 2016). 
 270. H.B. 207, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010); see also Virginia Hopeful for Eyewit-
ness Identification Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Nov. 30, 2010, 5:50 PM), 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Virginia_Hopeful_for_Eyewitness_Identifi
cation_Reform.php. 
 271. Div. of Legislative Automated Sys., 2010 Session: HB 207 Police Lineups; 
Establishes a Uniform Procedure to be Used by All Law-Enforcement Agencies, 
VA.’S LEGIS. INFORMATIONAL SYS., https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?
ses=101&typ=bil&val=hb207 (lasting visited Feb. 21, 2016). 
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Texas.  Texas has also attempted a legislative approach requiring law 
enforcement to develop and adopt written identification policies.  In 2011, the 
Texas legislature amended the Code of Criminal Procedure to include “Pho-
tograph and Live Lineup Identification Procedures.”272  The amendment re-
quires that “[e]ach law enforcement agency shall adopt, implement, and as 
necessary amend a detailed written policy regarding the administration of 
photograph and live lineup identification procedures.”273  The amendment 
further provides that law enforcement agencies may choose between adopting 
a model policy developed by the Law Enforcement Management Institute of 
Texas (“LEMIT”) or adopting an agency’s own policy that conforms to cer-
tain requirements.274  The model policy created by LEMIT offers “sample 
standard operating procedures,” including guidelines on sequential and blind 
photo arrays and live lineups.275 
Nevada & West Virginia.  Finally, Nevada and West Virginia have en-
acted laws requiring law enforcement agencies to adopt some type of written 
policy for live and photo lineups and showups.276  West Virginia’s statute 
mandates that law enforcement agencies provide written instructions to wit-
nesses, obtain confidence statements from witnesses, and create a written 
record of the entire procedure.277  Other permissive language of West Virgin-
ia’s statute, however, places it in a hybrid category between “top down” and 
“bottom up.” 
 
 272. History: HB 215, TEX. LEGISLATURE ONLINE HIST., http://www.capitol.state.
tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=82R&Bill=HB215 (last visited Jan. 28, 
2016); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.20 (West 2016). 
 273. H.R. 215, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011). 
 274. Id.  Policies that Texas agencies adopt on their own must be based on “credi-
ble field, academic, or laboratory research on eyewitness memory” and must address 
the selection of filler photographs, witness instructions, preservation of evidence, and 
administration procedures.  Id.  The Maryland legislature enacted a similar statute that 
states, “On or before December 1, 2007, each law enforcement agency in the State 
shall adopt written policies relating to eyewitness identification that comply with the 
United States Department of Justice standards on obtaining accurate eyewitness iden-
tification.”  MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-506(a) (West 2016).  Maryland re-
quires each law enforcement agency to file its policy with the Department of State 
Police.  Id. § 3-506(b). 
 275. Model Policy on Eyewitness Identification: Frequently Asked Questions, 
LAW ENFORCEMENT MGMT. INST. TEX. 1, 4–5, http://www.lemitonline.org/
publications/documents/ewid_faq.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (“The LEMIT model 
policy was drafted in response to § 3(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 
which required LEMIT to ‘develop, adopt, and disseminate to all law enforcement 
agencies in this state a model policy . . . regarding the administration of photograph 
and live lineup identification procedures.’”). 
 276. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.1237.1 (West 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-
1E-3 (West 2016). 
 277. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1E-2 & 62-1E-3. 
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2.  Assessing the Experimentalist Model 
Like any approach to reform, the experimentalist model has its ad-
vantages and disadvantages.  The risk of this approach, of course, is that local 
police agencies might ignore the scientific research and adopt policies that 
merely codify old, ineffective practices.  But the advantage is that police 
might examine the scientific research and find ways to implement it in proce-
dures that local police fully buy into and that accommodate local circum-
stances and needs.  Moreover, this approach offers the potential for retaining 
the flexibility to adapt practices to changes in the science and to allow crea-
tivity and experimentation in ways for implementing the scientific principles, 
fulfilling essentially the promise of the states (or even local agencies) to serve 
as laboratories of experimentation.278 
In this sense, this hybrid approach reflects some of the values and prin-
ciples underlying theories of “New Governance” and, in particular, the vari-
ant known as “Democratic Experimentalism.”279  As Katherine Kruse, who 
has analyzed the Wisconsin reforms under the democratic experimentalist 
paradigm, has explained: 
Democratic experimentalism eschews top-down “command-and-
control” regulation in favor of allowing practices to be developed 
from the bottom-up through provisional and localized problem solv-
ing, and embeds these local problem-solving efforts within larger 
structures of transparency that promote accountability and cross-
jurisdictional learning.280 
New Governance in general is viewed as a move away from processes 
of regulation in which experts formulate and impose rules upon those whom 
 
 278. The reference to states as laboratories of experimentation is attributed to 
Justice Brandeis’s dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann.  285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 279. “Democratic experimentalism,” as a part of a larger body of “new govern-
ance” scholarship, has been theorized broadly as a new or emerging paradigm in ad-
ministrative agency regulation.  See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitu-
tion of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting 
as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004); James S. Lieb-
man & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging 
Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
183 (2003); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Charles 
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004); William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. 
Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 127 (2004). 
 280. Kruse, supra note 24, at 648; see also Karkkainen, supra note 279, at 473–
74. 
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they regulate toward more “decentralized, flexible, and pragmatic approaches 
that seek participation from regulated industries or agencies in formulating 
the rules that govern them.”281  While police have not traditionally been 
viewed as administrative agencies, increasingly, scholars are recognizing that 
police operate like administrative agencies and are applying the democratic 
experimentalist paradigm to them.282  Indeed, nearly fifty years ago the influ-
ential police scholar Herman Goldstein recommended recognizing the police 
as an administrative agency with important policy-making responsibilities;283 
applying New Governance and Democratic Experimentalist theories of agen-
cy regulation to the police builds on that early prescription for improving 
policing in a complex world. 
The experimentalist model is premised on the belief that the old, expert-
based, top-down regulatory model resulted in static, “‘one-size-fits-all rules’ 
instead of nuanced responses to policy problems.”284  The theory is that the 
flexibility and openness of decentralized experimentation will lead to more 
democratic legitimacy accompanied by an expansion of knowledge and hence 
more effective responses to problems, which are amenable to constant revi-
sion and improvement. 
Several features of this paradigm are of particular salience in the eye-
witness identification context.  The experimentalist model is dependent for 
improved policymaking on information sharing, benchmarking to best prac-
tices, citizen engagement, and transparency and accountability.285 
Benchmarking refers to the practice of surveying reform models in other 
jurisdictions to identify those procedures that are superior to those the agency 
might otherwise use and that can be borrowed or adapted for use in the local 
jurisdiction.286  Benchmarking can occur through informal sharing of infor-
mation, or more formally through cross-jurisdictional or national coordinating 
agencies that gather information about and evaluate local problem-solving 
approaches.287  In the eyewitness identification context, benchmarking is a 
prominent feature of the reform efforts, as the social science research has 
 
 281. Kruse, supra note 24, at 673. 
 282. E.g., id.; Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 31; Simmons, supra note 
233, at 376 (“Modern police departments function like administrative agencies, and as 
such, they are susceptible to the same deficiencies that traditional agencies experience 
in other administrative contexts.”); id. at 400 (citing Michal Tamir, Public Law as a 
Whole and Normative Duality: Reclaiming Administrative Insights in Enforcement 
Review, 12 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 43, 44 (2006)) (“Although rarely viewed through the 
lens of administrative law, police departments operate in a manner similar to tradi-
tional regulatory agencies.”); Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empow-
ered Deliberation in Chicago Schools and Policing, 29 POL. & SOC’Y 73 (2001). 
 283. Herman Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving 
Police Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1130 (1967). 
 284. Simmons, supra note 233, at 405. 
 285. Kruse, supra note 24, at 677; Simmons, supra note 233, at 406. 
 286. Kruse, supra note 24, at 680; Simmons, supra note 233, at 406. 
 287. Kruse, supra note 24, at 680. 
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spawned numerous model policies and procedures, from which local jurisdic-
tions can borrow.288 
Indeed, to some extent, the prominence of accepted science-based best 
practices in this field is in tension with the democratic experimentalism ideal.  
The best practices are so well developed, based on expertise generated and 
recognized at high levels of academia and government, that the goal of the 
reform efforts is to a large extent trying to find ways to get local actors to 
simply adopt and apply them.  In that sense, the reform efforts do not much 
resemble local experimentation at all, and they have the familiar feel of the 
old, top-down, command-and-control governance models.  Reformers know 
what they want the local rules and practice to look like; they are just looking 
for ways to get police to adopt them and accept them. 
While there is considerable truth to this, the reality is that there remains 
room for localized experimentation.  For example, while the best practices 
call for blind protocols, there is plenty of room for experimenting about how 
best to make the procedures blind.  The most straightforward way to create 
blind procedures is to use a lineup administrator who does not know who the 
suspect is.  But many jurisdictions, especially smaller ones, find this method 
beyond their means, as they do not have the resources to find or use an extra 
individual who does not know about the case.  To solve this problem, many 
jurisdictions have adopted alternatives such as the folder shuffle method de-
scribed above,289 which permits a detective who knows everything about the 
case to conduct the procedure, because the folders effectively blind her from 
knowing which image the witness is observing when he makes his identifica-
tions.290  Still, others have developed procedures utilizing laptop computers 
that use self-guiding software to conduct the procedures, effectively eliminat-
ing any police personnel from the process.291  Another advantage of the lap-
tops is that the software is then capable of recording in minute detail im-
portant data about the identification procedure – from the sequence of the 
photos viewed to the witness’s response times on each photograph, the ex-
 
 288. See supra notes 286–87 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 290. While the folder shuffle method can be viewed as a local adaptation to na-
tionally set best practices, it was itself to a large extent the brainchild of a group of 
experts working at the national level.  Gary Wells explains: 
 
The origins [of the folder shuffle method] go back to the Technical Working 
Group that wrote the DOJ [NIJ] Guide that was published in 1999.  It was a 
late night brainstorm by the psychologists in the group.  Our idea was to coun-
ter the claim of the other members of the group that there was no way to do a 
blind process in smaller departments. 
 
E-mail from Gary Wells, Distinguished Professor of Psychology and the Wendy and 
Mark Stavish Chair in Soc. Scis. at Iowa State Univ., to author (Jan. 21, 2015) (on file 
with author). 
 291. See generally Wells et al., Double-Blind Photo-Lineups Using Actual Eye-
witnesses, supra note 78. 
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pressions on the witness’s face, and the exact words used by the witness in 
the process.292  As we shall see, local jurisdictions are experimenting with 
alternative packages of reforms as well as various sequences for implement-
ing them and unique ways of defining them and training their officers to use 
them.  Considerable experimentation and adaptation is possible. 
The experimentalist paradigm fits only loosely in other respects as well.  
Citizen engagement, for example, is an ideal that is generally realized only in 
modified form in this context.  In other related contexts, such as efforts to 
reform police misconduct (e.g., excessive use of force), citizen involvement is 
often seen as a critical part of the democratic experimentalist model.  Citizen 
engagement not only adds political legitimacy to policy reforms, but it is 
helpful in minimizing the “us vs. them” mentality that can mark the police-
citizen relationship.293  In the eyewitness identification context, however, 
there is very little direct citizen involvement in the rule-making process itself.  
The procedures just are not visible enough or salient enough to most people 
to activate much citizen engagement.  But the procedures do matter to police 
investigators on the streets, so the bottom-up process does produce local po-
lice engagement, which can help minimize the “us vs. them” attitude that 
fosters resistance to meddling from outside “experts.” 
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to realizing the experimentalist ideal in the 
eyewitness identification context, however, is that, in their current iterations, 
the eyewitness identification reforms lack effective mechanisms for ensuring 
accountability or “continuous change and improvement.”294  Democratic ex-
perimentalism is premised to a large degree on the notion that systems of 
transparency and accountability will operate to ensure that the experimenting 
continues, that knowledge continues to grow as local jurisdictions continually 
monitor the landscape and adopt evolving best practices.  It depends on “an 
interactive process in which higher-level authorities give lower-level ones 
autonomy, and the lower-level ones give the higher ones information that can 
then be used in a process of continuous monitoring and improvement through 
bench-marking and emulation of best practices.”295 
The bottom-up eyewitness identification reform efforts to date generally 
have weak or nonexistent mechanisms for ensuring accountability and shar-
 
 292. For an illustration of the laptop computer model in field work, see id. at 4–6. 
 293. Simmons, supra note 233, at 409. 
 294. Id. at 410. 
 295. Mark Tushnet, A New Constitutionalism for Liberals?, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 357, 358 (2003) (emphasis added).  As Karkkainen has put it, 
 
What is required . . . , democratic experimentalists argue, is a centrally coordi-
nated and monitored system of parallel local experiments, networked and disci-
plined through structured information disclosures and monitoring requirements, 
subject to rolling minimum performance benchmarks but otherwise free to ex-
periment in a continuous and ceaseless effort to improve, learn, and revise. 
 
Karkkainen, supra note 279, at 485. 
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ing of information, which democratic experimentalists deem essential to en-
suring continual change and advancement of knowledge.296  Many states 
simply mandate that local law enforcement agencies adopt “best practices,” 
sometimes referencing other model policies as benchmarks.297  But in some, 
no one has any responsibility for oversight or for evaluating the policies or 
their effectiveness, or often even for collecting them.  While some states in-
clude a provision for centralized collection, in others, one has to file an Open 
Records or Freedom of Information Act request in each local jurisdiction – 
and there are nearly 600 independent police jurisdictions in Wisconsin alone 
– to obtain a copy of each written policy.  Wisconsin’s statute does require 
that agencies revisit and reissue their policies every two years,298 but there is 
no mechanism to ensure that police actually rescan the environment to ensure 
that their policies are really state of the art.  It is doubtful that busy police 
departments, once having adopted a written policy, do much to assess its effi-
cacy and compliance with evolving scientific research. 
The only real accountability mechanism under most eyewitness identifi-
cation reform plans – beyond centralized collection of the policies in some 
states – is case-by-case litigation.  The courts become the default oversight 
institution.  That mechanism, however, is a weak one.  It depends in most 
jurisdictions on the ineffectual federal due process standards under Biggers 
and Brathwaite.  In jurisdictions that have adopted written identification poli-
cies, it largely remains to be seen whether or to what extent courts will incor-
porate those written policies into their due process analyses.  Absent that, in 
most jurisdictions it is unclear if courts will separately enforce compliance 
with the policies through suppression.  And it remains to be seen whether 
courts will rigorously (or at all) evaluate the adequacy of the written policies 
in light of the social science research.  It is, for example, unclear whether 
courts in jurisdictions such as Oregon or New Jersey, where the supreme 
courts have demanded attention to the social science research, will continue 
to adapt to evolving social science standards.  And case-by-case litigation by 
its nature suffers the deficiency of relying upon the skill, knowledge, and 
assertiveness of defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges on matters that lie 
well outside their formal legal training and expertise. 
There was some hope that courts in Wisconsin might take an active role 
in the democratic experimentalist approach when the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court decided State v. Dubose.299  As discussed, Dubose jettisoned the inef-
fectual Biggers/Brathwaite due process test for admissibility of eyewitness 
evidence and instead created a test that promised to demand police use of best 
practices.300  The court held that identification evidence would be inadmissi-
ble, regardless of what a court thought about its ultimate reliability, if police 
 
 296. Karkkainen, supra note 279, at 485. 
 297. Kruse, supra note 24, at 680. 
 298. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.50(3) (West 2016). 
 299. 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005). 
 300. Id. at 594–97. 
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used “unnecessarily suggestive” procedures.301  Because the local identifica-
tion policies adopted pursuant to the state statute would be a logical starting 
point for assessing unnecessary suggestiveness, judicial review could have 
become an effective enforcement tool.  Moreover, to the extent that a local 
agency were to adopt identification policies that conflict with the Wisconsin 
Department of Justice Model policies and with accepted best practices, re-
view for “unnecessary suggestiveness” might even have provided an oppor-
tunity for compelling local jurisdictions to either defend their use of their 
procedures or find ways to incorporate more science-based best practices.  
Thus, as Katherine Kruse observed shortly after the new eyewitness identifi-
cation regime went into place, “[t]he new state constitutional due process 
standard announced in Dubose can be seen as reinforcing the experimentalist 
structure of the legislation.”302 
Kruse, however, was skeptical of the efficacy of this accountability 
mechanism,303 and her skepticism now appears prescient.  As noted, despite 
the promise and the apparent applicability of the logic of Dubose, Wisconsin 
courts subsequently backed away from any role they might have played in 
generally holding police accountable for adopting and implementing best 
practices by limiting Dubose to showup identifications.  And while Wiscon-
sin courts have looked at the Wisconsin Department of Justice Model Policies 
and Procedures, and some of the policies adopted at the local level, they have 
not found non-compliance with those policies to provide an independent basis 
for suppression of the eyewitness evidence.304  There does not appear to be an 
effective mechanism for systematic oversight, accountability, and information 
sharing under the Wisconsin regime. 
The existing eyewitness identification reform models are thus imperfect 
fits within the democratic experimentalist paradigm.  But that is hardly unu-
sual, as scholars have observed that there probably is no system that perfectly 
embodies the new governance model.305  And despite some of the tensions, 
democratic experimentalism theory provides some useful guidance for poli-
cy-makers attempting to implement bottom-up approaches to eyewitness 
identification reform.  Most fundamentally, the bottom-up approach captures 
at least one of the key features of democratic experimentalism: the notion that 
 
 301. Id. at 594–95. 
 302. Kruse, supra note 24, at 689. 
 303. Id. at 650 (“[A]lthough Wisconsin’s innocence reforms are promising, they 
lack an adequate institutional structure to sustain a process of continuous reform.  The 
only mechanism that the reforms provide for holding local law enforcement agencies 
accountable to the experimentalist goals of cross-jurisdictional learning and public 
accountability is the exclusionary rule in individual cases.”). 
 304. E.g., State v. Drew, 740 N.W.2d 404, 406, (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming 
trial court ruling rejecting the “argument that suppression was required because the 
photo array procedure did not conform to the ‘Model Policy and Procedure for Eye-
witness Identification’ issued by the Office of the Attorney General (OAG)”). 
 305. Kruse, supra note 24, at 674; Simmons, supra note 233, at 419; Tushnet, 
supra note 295, at 358. 
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participatory policy-making enhances the chances for buy-in and hence effec-
tive reform in practice.  As Kruse put it, “The experimentalist governance 
paradigm promises that by being more closely involved in a collaborative and 
ongoing process of creating and revising the rules that govern their behavior, 
local actors will be more invested in complying with them.”306 
All of this suggests reasons to be both optimistic and pessimistic about 
the effectiveness of the reform efforts.  In the next Part, I engage more direct-
ly the key question circulating around all of this: How well has the democrat-
ic experimentalist experiment (and the other reform efforts) worked in prac-
tice?  To address this question, I compare data from several states, most 
prominently Wisconsin, to the national data collected by PERF and similar 
data collected in several other specific states. 
V.  PRELIMINARY DATA ON THE REFORM EFFORTS 
Because no one has yet systematically examined actual police practices 
under these various reform regimes, data do not yet exist to assess whether 
top-down or bottom-up approaches, or something in between, is most effec-
tive at reforming actual police conduct.  That research needs to be done and is 
forthcoming.  In the meantime, preliminary conclusions about reform efforts 
can be reached by analyzing what law enforcement agencies say, in writing, 
as a matter of policy their officers should do.  For top-down approaches, that 
analysis requires little more than reading the legislative (or in the case of New 
Jersey, the Attorney General’s) directives.  Those directives (laws) are dis-
cussed above.  For bottom-up or democratic experimentalist approaches, the 
task is a bit more complicated, because it requires collecting and analyzing 
each agency’s policies.  In this Part, I present and analyze that data. 
A.  National Comparisons 
The first goal of the democratic experimentalist model is to engage local 
actors in the problem-solving enterprise.  As a starting point for assessing the 
model’s impact, it is useful first to understand the level of police-agency poli-
cy engagement on eyewitness identification across all jurisdictions. 
Figure 1 shows that, nationwide, 64% of all law enforcement agencies 
have adopted some form of written eyewitness identification policy; this is a 
national average across top-down, bottom-up, and no reform jurisdictions.307  
Figure 1 also presents comparative data on rates of adopting identification 
policies for those individual states where such data has been collected, rang-
ing from a low of 9% in Pennsylvania in 2011, to a high of 95% in Wisconsin 
in 2012-13. 
 
 306. Kruse, supra note 24, at 683 (citing Jody Freeman, Collaborative Govern-
ance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 23–24 (1997)); see Simmons, 
supra note 233, at 410. 
 307. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 20, at vii. 
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FIGURE 1: 
Police Adoption of Eyewitness Identification Policy308
 
* Data collected before Georgia began serious reform efforts. 
** Data were collected before the Florida Innocence Commission and the Flori-
da Department of Law Enforcement issued suggested guidelines. 
*** Data collected prior to several local efforts to encourage California police 
to voluntarily adopt best practices. 
**** Data collected before the Michigan Council on Law Enforcement Stand-
ards voluntarily adopted standards requiring departments to implement new policies 
for eyewitness identification procedures. 
***** Georgia data reflects large jump in rate after Georgia pursued a voluntary 
training program for law enforcement.  The data precedes a 2015 statute that requires 
agencies to adopt written policies that contain scientifically supported best practices. 
 
These data show that the trend, over time, is toward greater adoption of 
eyewitness identification policies.  That suggests that reform efforts are work-
ing, at least to some extent.  Time alone does not entirely capture what is 
happening though, as significant disparities remain between states sampled at 
the same time. 
 
 308. Sources: GA. INNOCENCE PROJECT, LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEY (2007) (on 
file with author); INNOCENCE PROJECT OF FLORIDA, LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 
POLICE SURVEY (2010); TEMPLE UNIVERSITY LAW, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
POLICY SURVEY (2010); NEBRASKA INNOCENCE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION POLICY SURVEY; NORTHERN CALIFORNIA INNOCENCE PROJECT, FOIA 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION POLICY SURVEY (2010–2011); NEW ENGLAND 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION POLICY SURVEY (2011–2013); 
STATE BAR OF MICH., EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TASK FORCE (2012) (on file with 
author); Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitness Identifications and Police Practices: A Vir-
ginia Case Study, 2 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 9 (2014) [hereinafter Garrett, Eyewitness Identi-
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It is of course impossible to know from this data with any certainty what 
else accounts for these disparities.  Part of it may be regional and cultural 
differences.  Part may be political.  But at least some of the differences appear 
to reflect the impact of the statutes. 
Those jurisdictions that mandate written policies do indeed have higher 
rates of agency-adopted policies.  Of these states, the three with the highest 
agency-adopted policy rates are Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and Virginia (set 
forth as a separate cluster to the right in Figure 1).  These are the three states 
that mandate policies.309  Wisconsin and Virginia do it by laws that require 
police to adopt policies of their choosing;310 Massachusetts does it by judicial 
action.  At the time the data were collected, none of the other states had any 
policy mandates.  To the extent Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and Virginia rep-
resent experiments in democratic experimentalism, the data suggest that at its 
most basic level, the experiment is working – it does indeed generate greater 
local engagement with policy development.  A deeper dive into the policies in 
the next Part of this Article reveals that, in other respects, the experiment is 
indeed advancing the reform agenda, albeit imperfectly. 
B.  Democratic Experimentalism: The Wisconsin Data 
Because Wisconsin was a pioneer in the democratic experimentalist ap-
proach to eyewitness identification reform, I collected data on police policies 
in Wisconsin so that I could begin to assess its effectiveness.  I submitted 
Open Records Law311 requests to all 562 law enforcement agencies in the 
state,312 asking that they send me their written eyewitness identification poli-
cies and procedures.  I sent the first request in September 2007, nine months 
after the eyewitness identification law went into effect.  To increase the re-
sponse rate, I submitted follow-up requests for copies of the written policies 
to all the agencies again in 2012.  This time, in an attempt to get greater co-
operation, Captain Victor Wahl of the Madison Police Department joined me 
in making the request.313  I followed this up with another letter in 2013 to 
agencies that had not yet responded, and then my research assistant followed 
that up with phone calls to target non-responders to encourage them to submit 
 
 309. See supra notes 184–87, 266–72 and accompanying text. 
 310. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.50(4)–(5) (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
390.02 (West 2016). 
 311. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.31–.39 (West 2016). 
 312. The Wisconsin Department of Justice provides contact information for 72 
sheriff’s offices, 476 police departments, 13 university police departments, and 1 
municipal police department.  WIS. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WISCONSIN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORY (Feb. 28, 2014), https://wilenet.org/html/directory/Law-
Enforcement-Directory-2014-02-28.pdf. 
 313. Captain Wahl is a member of the Advisory Board of the Wisconsin Inno-
cence Project (“WIP”) at the University of Wisconsin Law School.  WIP’s New Advi-
sory Board, U. WIS. L. SCH. (July 25, 2011), http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/whats_new/
news/ipnewboard2011.html.  I am faculty co-director of WIP. 
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their policies.  In total, we received responses from 366 police agencies 
(65.1%), which included the vast majority of the larger city police depart-
ments and 94.4% of the county sheriff’s departments.  Of those agencies that 
responded, 349 (95.4%) indicated that they had a written policy and provided 
a copy of that policy. 
1.  Policy Dates 
As an initial matter, while imperfect, the Wisconsin data add weight to 
the conclusion that the high adoption rates are at least in part the product of 
the legislative demand.  Many of the written policies note the date they were 
adopted.  Figure 2 shows that, of all of the written policies, 81.1% (293 of 
349) of the policies (or at least their most recent iterations) either bore no date 
or were adopted after January 1, 2007, when the legislative requirement went 
into effect, suggesting that many were adopted (or revised) directly in re-
sponse to the legislation.314  Of those, 9.7% (34 of 349) bore a date between 
January 1, 2007, and September 13, 2007 – that is, after the law went into 
effect but before I submitted my first Open Records request.  Another 46.1% 
(161 of 349) adopted policies dated after September 13, 2007, after the agen-
cies received that first Open Records request.  These dates suggest that many 
of these agencies first adopted their policies only after they were asked to 
produce a copy.  Indeed, a number of agencies candidly admitted that they 
were unaware of the statutory requirement until my request alerted them to it.  
Were it not for this research, many likely would not have adopted policies, at 
least not as soon as they did. 
This experience also confirms the importance of providing oversight re-
sponsibility to someone other than the law enforcement agencies themselves 
to ensure that they know about and comply with the policy requirement.  
These data support Kruse’s observation that the experimentalist approach in 
Wisconsin, while promising, is incomplete because it lacks adequate mecha-
nisms for oversight, feedback, and accountability.  While filing Open Records 
requests can play a role in ensuring accountability, it is a haphazard mecha-
nism at best. 
  
 
 314. See 2005 Wis. Legis. Serv. 528 (setting effective date of the statute at Janu-
ary 1, 2007). 
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FIGURE 2: 
Dates of Wisconsin Police Agency Written Policies 
 
 
2.  Policy Adoption Rates 
Looking in more detail at Wisconsin, the data in Figure 3 show wide-
spread but incomplete compliance with the law and with the social-science-
based model policies.  Of the 349 Wisconsin police agencies that have a writ-
ten policy, 257 (73.6%) explicitly reference the statutory objective of reduc-
ing misidentifications.  Two hundred and ninety-nine of the written policies 
cover live lineup procedures, representing 81.7% of all (366) responding 
agencies, and 85.7% of all (349) responding agencies that have any sort of 
policy.315  All but one – 348 out of 349 – of the policies address photo array 
procedures – representing 99.7% of all Wisconsin agencies that have any 
policies, and 95.1% of all (366) responding agencies.  A surprisingly large 
number of agencies (334) include policies on showup procedures, represent-
ing 95.7% of agencies that have any policies and 91.3% of all responding 
agencies.  A much smaller number (202) have written policies on the use of 
composite sketches, representing 57.9% of agencies with any policies and 
55.2% of all responding agencies. 
 
 315. Fifty of the 349 agencies that responded with polices did not include proce-
dures for live lineups.  Eleven agencies specifically stated that they do not use live 
lineups.  Nine stated that live lineups are only allowed with the approval or assistance 
of a supervisor or the District Attorney’s office.  Two police departments use the 
county sheriff’s department’s facilities and procedures for live lineups.  Finally, 28 
written policies did not provide procedures for live lineups and did not explain why. 
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FIGURE 3: 
Wisconsin Police Agencies with Written Policies 
 
 
3.  Policy Source 
Other data from the Wisconsin policies reveal that, consistent with the 
democratic experimentalist ideal, local agencies have engaged in at least 
some localized experimenting.  The Wisconsin Attorney General actually 
promulgated not one, but two model policies.  One, the “long version,” span-
ning twenty-eight pages, provided an in-depth analysis of the social science 
research and a list of six critical recommendations.316  The other, the “short 
version,” at a mere three pages, was meant to be a short-hand reference for 
busy law enforcement agencies.317  It provided a condensed, shorter alterna-
tive that the law enforcement agencies could adopt and modify for their own 
departments’ policies.  The “short version” addressed photo arrays, live 
lineups, showups, and composites and recommended double-blind and se-
quential procedures.  It did not, however, explicitly endorse the “folder sys-
tem” if an independent administrator was unavailable.  Figure 4 shows that, 
of those agencies that adopted any sort of policy, 73 (20.9%) adopted the 
“short version” of the model policy, 19 (5.4 percent) adopted the entire “long 
version,” 111 (31.8%) adopted a policy that incorporated part of either the 
long or short version, and 146 (41.8%) adopted no form of the model policy.  
Thus, while a majority of local departments borrowed either partially or fully 
from the DOJ-sanctioned model policy, a significant minority declined to 
 
 316. WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31. 
 317. WIS. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MODEL POLICY DRAFT 1 (2005) [hereinafter WIS. 
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adopt the DOJ policies either in full or at all, but created something else of 
their own choosing. 
 
FIGURE 4: 
Source of Wisconsin Police Eyewitness ID Policies 
 
 
4.  Double-Blind & Sequential Procedures 
Despite this apparent experimentation, in the end, most – but not all – 
police departments settled on policies that incorporate much of the social 
science research and the “best practices.”  In particular, as summarized in 
Figure 5, a large majority of agencies adopted double-blind procedures for 
photo arrays and a smaller majority chose double-blind procedures for live 
lineups, indicating that even many agencies that declined to adopt the DOJ 
model policy in whole or in part nonetheless incorporated double-blind pro-
cedures.  For photo arrays, 229 agencies, or 65.8% of the 348 agencies with 
any photo array policies, mandate double-blind procedures in every case and 
another 69, or 19.8%, require double-blind “when possible.”  Thus, in total, 
298, or 85.6%, of all agencies with photo array policies require double-blind 
procedures either in every case or whenever possible.  For live lineups, 174 
agencies, or 58.2% of the 299 agencies with a policy on lineups, mandate 
double-blind procedures in every case, and another 53 agencies, or 17.7%, 
call for double-blind lineups “when possible.”  Thus, combined, 227 agen-
cies, or 75.9%, of all agencies with live lineup policies require double-blind 
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FIGURE 5: 




Figure 6 reveals that even more agencies adopted sequential than dou-
ble-blind procedures.  For photo arrays, 285 agencies, representing 81.9% of 
the 348 agencies with photo array policies, require sequential procedures in 
every case.  Another 24 agencies, or 6.9%, call for sequential procedures 
“when feasible.”  Combined, 309 agencies, or 88.8% of agencies with photo 
array policies, require sequential procedures in every case or whenever feasi-
ble.  For live lineups, 241 agencies, or 80.6% of the 299 agencies with a live 
lineup policy, require sequential procedures in every case, and another 10 
agencies, or 3.3%, require sequential procedures when feasible.  Combined, 
83.9% of Wisconsin police agencies with written policies on lineup proce-
dures require sequential procedures either in every case or when feasible. 
 
FIGURE 6: 
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While the experimentalist approach in Wisconsin has led a majority of 
agencies to adopt double-blind and sequential procedures, the results are not 
perfect.  First, a significant number of agencies still have not adopted either 
double-blind or sequential procedures.  Second, and more troublingly, as 
shown in Figure 7, more agencies have adopted sequential procedures than 
blind procedures.  According to the research, however, blind procedures are 
more important than the sequential procedures.  Yet police appear more en-
amored with the sequential procedure than the double-blind procedure.  In-
deed, in the social science literature, sequential procedures are recommended 
only if conducted in a double-blind manner.  Without blinding, the sequential 
procedure, which permits a witness to spend more time focused on a single 
photo or individual while engaged with a detective who knows whether that 
individual or photo is the suspect, is especially vulnerable to the kinds of 
even unintentional cuing that the blind procedure is designed to minimize.318  
Left to their own devices, some police agencies have thus inadvertently 








A deeper examination of the way Wisconsin agencies approach double-
blind procedures reveals additional agency-level experimentation and varying 
degrees of concordance with best practices.  Table 1 shows again that, while 
most agencies have adopted double-blind protocols to one degree or another, 
nearly fifteen percent do not for photo arrays, and a full quarter do not for live 
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lineups.  Additionally, Table 1 reveals that a majority of agencies – 58% for 
live lineups and 63% for photos – instruct lineup administrators not to be in a 
position in which they could influence the witness (in addition to or instead of 
running the procedures in a double-blind manner).  And a slightly smaller 
majority – 57% for both live lineups and photo arrays – instruct lineup ad-
ministrators somewhat ambiguously to “minimize suggestiveness.” 
 
TABLE 1: 
Policies on Blind Procedures 
 




Double-blind—always 65.8% (229) 65.0% (174) 
Double-blind—when possible 19.8% (69) 17.7% (53) 
No mention of double-blind 14.4% (50) 24.1% (72) 
Administrator should not be in posi-
tion to influence the witness 
63.2% (220) 58.2% (174) 
Administrator must “minimize sug-
gestiveness” 
56.9% (193) 57.2% (171) 
 
When agency policies call for sequential procedures, they are even more 
likely to make them mandatory than when they call for making blind proce-
dures mandatory.  Table 2 shows that 82% of all agencies require sequential 
display of photos “always,” and only 7% call for sequential “when feasible.”  
Only 11% make no mention of the sequential procedure. 
Table 2 also shows that a minority of agencies address what happens 
when a witness asks to see the sequential display a second time.  Researchers 
caution that a second “lap” through the sequential process should never be 
offered, but leave it to the discretion of local agencies to permit the second 
lap if a witness requests it, with the understanding that the second lap reduces 
or eliminates the advantages of the sequential procedure because repeated 
viewings permits the witness to engage in the relative judgment process.319  
Among Wisconsin’s agencies, 40% permit a second lap for photo arrays, and 
26% permit it for live lineups. 
Finally, Table 2 also shows that some agencies, but again a minority, 
provide additional research-supported guidance on how to conduct the folder 
shuffle method as a way to achieve blinded testing.  Research and Wiscon-
sin’s Model Policy instruct that the suspect should not be placed in the first 
position because witnesses are often reluctant to pick the first photo or person 
they see.320  Additionally, the Model Policy recommends putting two blank or 
empty folders at the bottom of the sequential stack so that the witness will not 
know when she has viewed the last photo and therefore will not feel com-
 
 319. See generally N.K. Steblay et al., Sequential Lineup Laps and Eyewitness 
Accuracy, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 262 (2011). 
 320. WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31, at 9. 
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pelled to pick someone too soon.321  Of Wisconsin’s agencies, 44% instruct 
officers not to put the suspect in the first position for photo arrays (and relat-
edly, 30% offer that guidance for live lineups).  Additionally, 40% of policies 
call for two blank or empty folders at the end of the sequential procedure (that 
recommendation has no application to live lineups). 
 
TABLE 2: 
Policies on Sequential Procedures 
 




Sequential – always 81.9% (285) 80.6% (241) 
Sequential – when feasible 6.9% (24) 3.3% (10) 
Sequential not prescribed 11.2% (39) 16.1% (48) 
Allow repeat showings (“laps”) if 
witness requests 
40.5% (141) 26.4% (79) 
Suspect should never be in first  
position 
44% (153) 30.4% (91) 
Blank folders should be put at the 
end 
39.9% (139) N/A 
5.  Constructing & Conducting the Lineup or Array 
Table 3 shows that some but not all agencies provide additional guid-
ance on essential components of constructing a lineup or photo array.  A 
small majority, for example, provides directions on how many fillers (known 
innocents) to include.  There is no social-science-based gold standard for the 
optimal number of fillers to include in a procedure.  The general rule is that, 
up to a point, the more fillers the better.  The Wisconsin Attorney General’s 
Model Procedure recommends a minimum of five fillers.322  Despite the fun-
damental nature of this component of any identification procedure, more than 
a third of Wisconsin agency policies on photo arrays (36%), and almost half 
of the policies on live lineups (47%) provide no guidance on the recommend-
ed number of fillers.  On the other hand, those that do specify a minimum 
number of fillers almost uniformly meet or exceed the Wisconsin Attorney 
General’s recommendation of at least five fillers.  For photo arrays, only 3% 
recommend fewer than five fillers, while for live lineups, nearly 38% recom-
mend a minimum of fewer than five.  The difference almost certainly reflects 
the greater difficulty of finding appropriate fillers for live lineups than for 
photo arrays. 
Table 3 also shows that most agencies provide at least some guidance on 
how to select fillers so as to minimize suggestiveness, although many agency 
policies do not comport fully with best practices.  For photo arrays, more than 
 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 8. 
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95% of agencies provide guidance on selecting fillers, and for live lineups, 
80% provide such guidance.  But a large majority of agencies continue to 
recommend outdated means of doing so, rather than the method recommend-
ed by the Attorney General’s Office.  The Attorney General’s Model Policy 
explicitly recommends matching the fillers to the description of the perpetra-
tor, rather than to the suspect, when possible.323  Only a minority of agencies 
recommend the match-to-description method (23% for photo arrays and a 
mere 16% for live lineups); the majority (73% for photo arrays and 64% for 
lineups), continue to recommend the traditional method of matching the fill-
ers to the suspect. 
 
TABLE 3: 
Guidance on Use of Fillers 
 
 Photo Policies 
(N=348) 
Lineup      
Policies 
(N=299) 
Minimum of 4 fillers  3.2% (11) 37.8% (113) 
Minimum of 5 fillers  47.4% (165) 10.7% (32) 
Minimum of 6 fillers  10.1% (35) 3.3% (10) 
Minimum of 7 fillers  2.9% (10) 10% (3) 
No prescribed number of fillers 36.5% (127) 47.2% (141) 
   
Fillers should match the suspect 22.7% (79) 16.4% (49) 
Fillers should match description of 
perpetrator provided by the witness 
72.7% (253) 63.5% (190) 
No guidance provided on selecting 
fillers 
4.6% (16) 20% (60) 
 
An important component of the social-science-based best practices, also 
reflected in the Wisconsin Attorney General’s Model Policy, is proper wit-
ness instructions.324  Table 4 shows that most, but again not all, Wisconsin 
police department policies require specific witness instructions.  Nearly three-
quarters of photo array policies include the most important instruction: that 
the real perpetrator might or might not be present in the photo array or lineup.  




 323. Id. at 8–9. 
 324. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text; see also WIS. DOJ MODEL 
POLICY, supra note 31, at 10. 
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TABLE 4: 
Policies on Witness Instructions 
 
 Photo      
Policies 
(N=348) 
Lineup    
Policies 
(N=299) 
Witness should be instructed the       
perpetrator might not be present 
74.4% (259) 72.6% (217) 
Witness should be instructed that the 
administrator does not know who the 
suspect is 
62.1% (216) 64.5% (193) 
Witness should be instructed that it as 
important to clear the innocent as     
identify the guilty 
31.9% (111) 31.4% (94) 
Witness should be instructed s/he does 
not need to identify anyone 
35.6% (124) 31.1% (91) 
Witness should be instructed that facial 
hair and clothes can change one’s     
appearance 
38.2% (133) 33.1% (99) 
 
To guard against confidence malleability, the research and the Wiscon-
sin Attorney General’s Model Policy also strongly recommend taking verba-
tim confidence statements immediately after an identification, before the wit-
ness has received any feedback.325  Table 5 shows that, while a majority of 
Wisconsin agencies require prompt recording of witness statements (62% for 
both photo arrays and live lineups), more than one-third of the policies do 
not.  Moreover, even fewer agency policies – less than one-third for both 
photo arrays and live lineups – explicitly require that confidence statements 
be taken verbatim. 
 
TABLE 5: 
Policies on Confidence Statements 
 
 Photo      
Policies 
(N=348) 
Lineup    
Policies 
(N=299) 
Witness confidence must be assessed 
and recorded immediately 
61.8% (215) 62.2% (186) 
Witness’s confidence statement should 
be recorded verbatim 
31.9% (111) 28.8% (86) 
Avoid multiple procedures with the same 
witness 
63.8% (222) 63.5% (190) 
Include only one suspect per procedure 39.9% (139) 29.8% (89) 
 
 325. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text; see also WIS. DOJ MODEL 
POLICY DRAFT, supra note 317, at 10. 
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Finally, key components of best-practices recommendations and the At-
torney General’s Model Policy include directives to avoid presenting the sus-
pect to any witness or witnesses in more than one procedure and to include 
only one suspect per photo array or lineup.326  Table 6 reveals that nearly 
two-thirds of the photo array and live lineup policies include this directive, 
while only 40% of the policies specifically provide for only one suspect per 
photo array, and only 30% the live lineup policies include that provision. 
 
TABLE 6: 
Policies on Multiple Procedures & Multiple Suspects 
 
 Photo Policies 
(N=348) 
Lineup    
Policies 
(N=299) 
Avoid multiple procedures with the 
same witness 
63.8% (222) 63.8% (190) 
Include only one suspect per photo 
array 
39.9% (139) 29.8% (89) 
6.  Policies on Showups 
Wisconsin data on one-on-one showups also provide some support for 
the democratic experimentalist approach – but again with caveats.  The data 
reveal an area of agency involvement in policy development that top-down 
regulators (legislators) have largely overlooked.  Few, if any, legislative di-
rectives address showups.  But left to create their own identification policies, 
most Wisconsin police departments did; indeed, more agencies adopted poli-
cies on showups than on live lineups.  That almost certainly reflects the fact 
that showups are much more relevant to most police agencies than are live 
lineups.  Showups are easy to conduct, and almost all police agencies have 
used them historically.  They require no set-up and simply entail the expedi-
ency of presenting a suspect to a witness on the scene shortly after the of-
fense.  And they can be employed even where police lack probable cause to 
arrest a suspect.  Live lineups, however, are difficult to arrange.  They require 
access to a large pool of individuals from which police can select a sufficient 
number of appropriate fillers (fillers who fit the description of the perpetrator 
or who match the suspect).  Most agencies simply do not have access to that 
many bodies.  And they usually require a suspect who is in custody.  Conse-
quently, most police agencies do not do many, if any, live lineups.  The com-
paratively lower number of live lineup policies, therefore, likely reflects the 
reality that the agencies do not do live lineups (and hence have no need for a 
 
 326. See supra notes 70–101 and accompanying text; see also WIS. DOJ MODEL 
POLICY DRAFT, supra note 317, at 8. 
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policy), rather than a failure to comply fully with the legislative directive to 
develop relevant eyewitness identification policies. 
Showups also suggest significant local experimentation and creativity 
because, while the Wisconsin Attorney General’s Model Policy addressed 
showups, it did not include them in the list of six key recommendations.  The 
Attorney General’s Office, instead, addressed showups only deep in the body 
of its long-form report and not at all in its short-form policy.327  Accordingly, 
to the extent that agencies were borrowing from the Attorney General’s mod-
el policy, they had to dig deeper and work harder to come up with a policy.  
Nonetheless, nearly 96% of agencies with any eyewitness identification poli-
cies included policies on showups. 
Two reasons likely account for this.  First, because virtually all law en-
forcement agencies use showups to one extent or another, they likely deemed 
this an important issue to include in their policies.  Nothing in the legislation 
required them to address showups, but given that they were bound to develop 
eyewitness identification policies in general, they identified showups as an 
important procedure to address. 
Second, in 2005, the year the legislature passed the law requiring law 
enforcement policies, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided State v. 
Dubose.328  Recall that in Dubose the court changed the law on showups, 
holding that showup evidence is inadmissible unless police can demonstrate 
exigent circumstances requiring them to use this inherently suggestive proce-
dure.329  Constructing a photo array or live lineup typically requires time and 
prolonged access to the suspect, making an arrest a precondition in most cas-
es.  By contrast, showups can be conducted without probable cause because 
police can legally detain a suspect long enough to present the suspect to the 
witness at the scene based upon mere reasonable suspicion.330  According to 
the Dubose court, showup evidence is ordinarily inadmissible unless police 
lacked probable cause to arrest; if police had probable cause, then a showup 
was not necessary (hence, there were no exigent circumstances).331  Police 
could have, and should have, arrested the suspect and taken the time to con-
struct a proper photo array or live lineup.332 
While this latter rationale might help explain why showups are deemed 
an important topic for inclusion in police policies, it also raises an anomaly.  
If, indeed, the limitations imposed on police by Dubose were the animating 
factor, then one would expect police to adopt policies on showups that com-
port with the demands of Dubose.  But to a surprising degree, they do not.  Of 
the 334 responding agencies with written policies on showups, 258 (77.2%) 
specified, as demanded by Dubose, that showups should only be used in “ex-
 
 327. See WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY DRAFT, supra note 317, at 17, 23–26. 
 328. 699 N.W.2d 582, 582 (Wis. 2005). 
 329. Id. at 593. 
 330. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968). 
 331. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 594. 
 332. Id. 
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igent circumstances” – but that means that nearly a quarter of the agencies 
that adopted a showup policy failed to adopt a policy that comports with this 
clear legal requirement.  Moreover, only 60 agencies (18% of agencies with a 
showup policy) defined exigent circumstances in this context as circumstanc-
es in which police lacked probable cause to arrest, as the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court held in Dubose.  As depicted in Figure 8, agencies adopted a variety of 
constraints on their use of showups, which comport with Dubose to varying 
degrees.  The failure to achieve higher levels of compliance with Dubose, 
even on paper let alone in practice, suggests at least some limits to the effec-
tiveness of command-and-control reform strategies reflected by the Dubose 
mandate.  This is not, of course, to argue that mandates such as Dubose are of 
no value, but rather to point out that full effectiveness will depend upon strat-
egies that inform and enforce once the mandate is in place. 
 
FIGURE 8: 




In sum, the Wisconsin data show that the bottom-up experimentalist ap-
proach has produced real advancements in local policies, but has permitted 
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continue utilizing outdated and problematic procedures.  Wisconsin police, on 
paper at least, are far ahead of the national norms for eyewitness identifica-
tion policies, but there remains plenty of room for continued reform. 
C.  The Virginia Comparison 
Fuller insights into the experimentalist approach can be gleaned from a 
comparison of Wisconsin’s experience to that in Virginia, as analyzed by 
Brandon Garrett.333  Virginia’s short statutory directive – requiring police to 
adopt written eyewitness identification policies – arose in a police culture in 
which there had been scant previous attention paid to identification proce-
dures.  Prior to enactment of its eyewitness identification statute, from 1993-
2005, the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (“DCJS”) had 
just a short, “barebones” model policy – just a few lines long – that “offered 
no instructions and almost no guidance at all on how to conduct . . . different 
types of [identification] procedures.”334  Following enactment of Virginia’s 
statute in 2005, requiring every agency to adopt eyewitness identification 
policies, the DCJS revised and updated its recommended model policy.335  
The revised policy added for the first time an introduction to concepts such as 
the use of blind and sequential identification procedures and the description 
of detailed, clear instructions to be provided to eyewitnesses, including an 
instruction that the suspect “may or may not be present.”336  But the 2005 
model policy provided no instructions on how to use the folder system, which 
many smaller jurisdictions elsewhere have found essential to their ability to 
blind their processes.337  And most problematically, the 2005 model policy 
made the same mistake that some Wisconsin police agencies have made of 
making sequential procedures mandatory, but blind procedures only option-
al.338 
In 2010, the DCJS surveyed law enforcement in Virginia and found that, 
despite the legislative directive to adopt written polices, at least 25% of the 
agencies that responded still had no policy at all.339  Of the agency policies 
reviewed in that survey, 66% adopted the sequential method, but only 6% 
required blind procedures.340  As noted above, police apparently unwittingly 
adopted the worst-case combination of recommended reforms.  A follow-up 
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survey of 267 law enforcement agencies found that most Virginia police de-
partments still had not adopted best practices.341 
In November 2011, the DCJS again revised its model policies, this time 
issuing a comprehensive set of recommendations fully based on the social 
science research.342  The model policy recommends a number of best practic-
es, including the “Folder Shuffle Method” that “was devised to address con-
cerns surrounding limited personnel resources while allowing for blind ad-
ministration.”343  The model policy also recommends double-blind admin-
istration and sequential viewing for both photo and live Lineup Procedures.344  
The model is purely advisory.345  Despite this new, comprehensive, and well-
drafted policy, reform has still been slow to come.346  Nearly two years after 
the model policy was adopted, Garrett found that even then, “the vast majori-
ty of agencies across Virginia have failed to implement the best practices.”347 
A comparison of Virginia’s agency policies to Wisconsin’s agency poli-
cies on some of the key variables is presented in Figure 9.  Garrett requested 
the written policies from the 300-plus police agencies in the state.348  Of 
those, 201 responded and 145 provided written policies; one-fifth of the 
agencies still lacked any policy at all, in violation of the Virginia statute.349  
Of the 144 reviewed policies, only 6% had implemented the 2011 model pol-
icy; only 40% required blind lineup procedures or even made them optional; 
only 9 agencies described the folder shuffle method as an option; 43 out of 
144 had no provisions regarding the need to minimize suggestion; only 88 of 
144 included standard witness instructions; and most (84/144) had no policies 
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suspect’s identity but is not in a position to see which members of the line-up 
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at all on showups.350  Problematically, far more policies required sequential 
than blind procedures; 63% required or suggested sequential procedures, but 
only 40% required or suggested blind procedures.351 
 
FIGURE 9: 




While the data cannot be used to draw firm conclusions about causation, 
the Virginia story suggests some possible explanations for the underperfor-
mance of Virginia police compared to Wisconsin police.  The experience 
suggests that simply directing police to do something is not enough.  The 
Virginia law did little to guide law enforcement about what was expected of 
them, the reasons they should adopt policies, or even the existence of model 
policies and the body of social science research.  When the state finally up-
dated its model policies, they were inadequate and confused.  Little was done 
to create a culture of shared participation and responsibility. 
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Together, given the much higher rates of policy engagement in Wiscon-
sin and Virginia compared to national norms, and the sure but incomplete 
movement toward best practices, the Wisconsin and Virginia experiences 
suggest that the Democratic Experimentalist model has real potential to work 
from the bottom up to improve law enforcement practices.  But those experi-
ences also reinforce the notion that real experimentalist reform requires not 
only the freedom for local experimentation and an obligation to address a 
problem, but also systems for benchmarking “best practices,” setting stand-
ards, measuring outcomes, sharing learning, and ensuring accountability.  In 
the end, Kate Kruse was likely correct when she observed that “if the experi-
mentalist potential of the Wisconsin reforms is to come to fruition, adminis-
trative agencies--specifically the Wisconsin Department of Justice--will need 
to take a more active role in creating structures of information coordina-
tion.”352 
CONCLUSION 
Translating learning about wrongful convictions into reform of the crim-
inal justice system has proven to be a challenge.  Even with eyewitness iden-
tification evidence – on which there is near-unanimous agreement about what 
needs to be done to improve police practices – reform has been slow and un-
even.  The diffusion of the criminal justice system across fifty states and 
18,000 independent law enforcement agencies poses particular challenges and 
demands locally tailored responses.  The states have experimented with alter-
native methods of effecting reform, from top-down, command-and-control 
legislation or judicial mandates, to hands-off education and persuasion ap-
proaches, to a middle path involving systems for imposing reform obligations 
on police, without dictating the nature of the reforms, in a manner that loosely 
fits within “new government” and “democratic experimentalism” models of 
agency regulation. 
While the results have been mixed, it does appear that the democratic 
experimentalist model has real potential for engaging police constructively in 
solving the problem of eyewitness error.  The data also suggest, however, that 
careful attention must be paid to essential components of a new governance 
model and, in particular, the necessity for appropriate benchmarking, ac-
countability, and feedback.  To date, no existing legislation has fully ad-
dressed those essential components, and the reforms have suffered as a con-
sequence.  None of this is to say that the experimentalist model is necessarily 
superior to the command-and-control model, as that conclusion requires addi-
tional research examining actual police practices on the streets.  But it does at 
least suggest that, done properly and in the right circumstances, the new gov-
ernance approach can be part of the solution to the problem of eyewitness 
misidentification.
 
 352. Kruse, supra note 24, at 650. 
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